The EU’s inadequate response to democratic regression has created frustration among some former EU supporters in Poland. Radoslaw Markovsky and Pyotr ZagorskyThis has given rise to a new group of “Euro-disillusioned” people who are dampening their enthusiasm for European integration.
According to the V-Dem Institute, Poland has become the country most likely to regress to authoritarianism under the Law and Justice Government (2015-2023). In response, the EU has invoked the “nuclear option” – the Article 7 procedure that allows the EU to impose sanctions on member states that violate core EU values.
However, the fact that this procedure relies on unanimity among member states made it ineffective, and the Polish and Hungarian governments formed a “regressive coalition” to block sanctions. Nor did the European Court of Justice’s ruling that the Polish reforms were incompatible with EU law and the demand for the immediate suspension of new laws protect the rule of law.
Public reaction
This failure has been explained by the so-called “authoritarian balance”, which holds that the weakness of the EU party system protects autocrats from EU intervention, while EU funding and the immigration of disaffected citizens enabled by the EU’s free movement of people help these regimes stay in power.
Less well known is the impact of the EU’s inadequate response on individuals’ attitudes toward the EU. Polish society stands out as one of the most pro-European societies within the EU, but among some ex-European supporters in Poland, there is growing pessimism about the nature, fundamental values and implementation of EU procedures in Brussels.
This practice has been seen as hesitant, slow and ineffective in dealing with politicians and governments who clearly violate fundamental EU values, especially in the area of the rule of law. The phenomenon is not yet widespread, but disappointment is already palpable and a complex love-hate relationship with the EU has developed, which we call “self-limiting Euro-mania.”
We now see a new category of individuals who were previously strongly supportive of integration but are now disillusioned with the EU’s slow response to violations of the rule of law. We call this group of individuals “Eurodisappointed.” We argue that this phenomenon is different from traditional Euroscepticism because Eurodisappointed people do not express “contingent or limited” or “outright and unconditional opposition to the European integration process.”
Characteristics of “Euro Disappointment”
We assume that Eurodisappointers are deeply rooted in the general idea and core values of the EU. However, they temporarily refrain from unconditional gratitude to the EU, mainly because of what they perceive as – in their view – political malfunctions of the EU. We believe that Eurodisappointers consciously “self-limit” their gratitude to the EU and their expectations for the future. Eurodisappointment is therefore “The EU’s procedural and political errors have limited enthusiasm for European integration, leaving the rule of law and human rights poorly defended.
There are two basic assumptions in this definition. First, only those who support European integration can be classified as Eurodisillusioned. Second, Eurodisillusionment is directly related to the EU’s slow response to the erosion of the rule of law and democratic principles in EU member states.
Based on original survey data collected in Poland from April 2020 to May 2021, we found that euro disappointment is more widespread among women, supporters of liberal democracy, and those dissatisfied with the functioning of democracy in Poland (see Figure 1). With regard to gender, this phenomenon may be unique to Poland due to the strong anti-abortion stance of the Law and Justice government and the prominent anti-abortion ruling of the Constitutional Court in October 2020.
Figure 1: Factors explaining Poland’s euro disappointment
Note: Data for 2021. If the horizontal line does not cross the vertical zero line, there is a significant positive or negative association with Eurodisappointed. For more information, see the authors’ accompanying paper. European Union politics.
We also tentatively assume that the recent decline in EU sentiment in Poland may be at least partly due to a decline in support for integration among social strata disillusioned with the EU’s inadequate response to rule of law and human rights violations (see Figure 2).
Figure 2: Changes in support for European integration by social profile in Poland
Note: Data is for 2020-2021. For more details, please refer to the authors’ attached paper. European Union politics.
We do not claim that this phenomenon is universal in the EU. Future research is needed to test how widespread this phenomenon is in other countries facing a recession (Hungary) and in more established democracies in Western Europe. For example, could Eurodisillusionment also be experienced by specific minorities (e.g. LGBTIQ+) who are concerned about not being able to defend their rights in other EU countries? For now, Eurodisillusionment may be a peripheral phenomenon that affects specific groups and has limited political impact. However, it could potentially develop into a significant constraint and challenge for the future of the EU.
For further details, please see the authors’ attached paper. European Union politics
Note: This article presents the views of the author and does not necessarily reflect the position of EUROPP (European Politics and Policy) or the London School of Economics. Featured image source: European Union
