The new European Commission includes a dedicated Commissioner for the Mediterranean. Emanuele Erichiello We examine what these changes could mean for relations between the EU and the countries of the Mediterranean region.
On December 1, the newly approved European Commission was officially launched. An important and somewhat underappreciated innovation of the new Commission is the creation of a dedicated Secretary-General and portfolio of members focused solely on the Mediterranean.
Historically, EU-Mediterranean relations have been shaped by ambitious but often disappointing plans. For example, the 1995 Barcelona Process envisioned a regional framework for shared prosperity, emphasizing trade liberalization, cultural dialogue, and common political reforms. However, the project has struggled to deliver tangible results due to geopolitical tensions, lack of cohesive governance, and differing priorities among member states.
Likewise, the European Neighborhood Policy, launched in 2003, sought to build closer relationships with neighboring countries through financial support and policy coordination, but faced criticism that its impact was limited and that it was an overly top-down approach. I’m here. These recent changes may therefore reflect a realignment of the EU’s geopolitical focus after decades of declining interest in the South. But how do we interpret this new plan from what we know so far?
The death of local construction
The first Mediterranean Commissioner will be Dubravka Šuica, a Croatian politician who previously served as Vice-President for Democracy and Demography at the European Commission. This new position represents a structural departure from the previous agreement, where Mediterranean cooperation fell under the broader remit of the Neighborhood and Enlargement Commissioners. However, the details of this “new focus” require closer examination.
The mission letter from Commission President Ursula von der Leyen highlights migration management as a key pillar of the new portfolio to be driven by the “New Agreement for the Mediterranean”. Specific guidelines include operationalizing the external aspects of EU migration policy, strengthening strict border controls, combating human trafficking and establishing “temporary” partnerships with transit countries to combat illegal migration.
References to human rights and democratic values remain rare, meaning a shift in focus away from governance reforms, the rule of law and civil society engagement that were core principles of the EU’s southern region foreign policy in the past. It is not surprising that this strategy has been criticized for prioritizing EU security concerns over the wider development and humanitarian needs of countries in the region.
Other focuses of Šuica’s mandate include trade, investment and energy cooperation through what the new commissioner called the “Trans-Mediterranean Energy and Clean Technology Cooperation Initiative” in his keynote speech. This upcoming plan is in line with the EU’s broader agenda to secure energy diversification in light of geopolitical challenges, particularly the ongoing energy crisis triggered by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In this context, North African countries such as Algeria and Morocco are ready to play an important role as energy suppliers and future green energy sources.
Broadly speaking, von der Leyen’s letter to Šuica calls for prioritizing a “comprehensive partnership” to promote participation in the aforementioned areas. Reading the document, it is clear that these partnerships are expected to be based on bilateral, country-based frameworks rather than regional initiatives.
These changes, together with recent policy developments such as the recent reform of the European Neighborhood Policy, signal a further move in the EU’s efforts to politically integrate the Mediterranean region. We can thus see the end of all attempts to pursue regional building in the Mediterranean as envisioned in the Barcelona Process 30 years ago.
Transition to real politics
The new portfolio marks a shift towards a more transactional approach in the EU’s relationship with the North African country. As former Commission President Romano Prodi argued in 2004, these countries are being excluded and securitized as Europe’s “borders” rather than being included in a regional framework that shares “everything but the institutions” with the EU. It now appears to only concern EU interests related to migration and energy.
The establishment of a separate Mediterranean Secretariat institutionalizes the separation of the Southern Region from the Western Balkans, Eastern Europe and South Caucasus, which are currently overseen by the Enlargement Secretariat. This division marks a significant departure from the strategic vision of the 1990s and early 2000s that sought to include all Mediterranean countries in a single regional framework.
The fundamental principles of the Barcelona Process and European Neighborhood Policy have therefore been gradually eroded, resulting in a narrowing focus on security, immigration control and economic interests. This realignment reflects a broader trend in EU foreign policy where “pragmatic” considerations trump normative commitments and immediate pressures outweigh long-term strategic goals. These approaches address short-term challenges but fall short of providing a transformative vision for the Mediterranean.
What Mediterranean?
The EU’s new focus on the Mediterranean poses serious challenges. The historical record of Euro-Mediterranean initiatives is marked by unmet expectations and limited impact. This further shift towards bilateralism risks fragmenting regional cooperation efforts within and outside the EU and undermining collective solutions to transnational challenges such as climate change and terrorism.
The final directive of the Šuica mission’s letter – to develop a strategic communication plan to counter anti-EU narratives – also highlights the country’s growing obsession with managing perceptions and sentiments in its southern neighbors rather than addressing structural problems. The anti-European narrative has really grown in North Africa, especially since the 2011 uprisings. But prioritizing this over promoting substantive policy change risks further undermining the EU’s trust and credibility in the eyes of its North African partners.
The newly established portfolio could therefore undermine faith in the EU’s commitment to fostering genuine partnerships in the wider Mediterranean, potentially creating greater political distance between North Africa and Europe. It also makes clear that the traditional model of Euro-Mediterranean partnership is now gone.
Note: This article gives the views of the author and not the position of EUROPP (European Politics and Policy) or the London School of Economics. Main image source: © European Union, 2024
