“Who is guarding the guardians?” In other words, the military exists to protect the country, but who guarantees and supervises the country’s obedience? This nearly 2,000-year-old problem has preoccupied policymakers throughout history. Because if this problem is not addressed, the consequences can be dire. Without effective oversight, the military can use its material power to undermine or overthrow civilian authority through coups or other methods of intervention. The heart of the dilemma lies in the inherent tension between civilian politics and military security. The former derives authority from legitimacy, while the latter exercises material power. To prevent governance from being undermined by these dilemmas, it is essential that the military consistently adheres to the authority of civilian leaders in all circumstances. Therefore, making the military apolitical becomes the crux of the problem.
Nonetheless, many countries around the world have been overthrown by their own defenders in worst-case scenarios. Even if the Guardians decide not to revolt, the problem persists. The military may deliberately evade policies adopted by civilian governments or politicize itself to exploit its own preferences. As a result, a politicized and unprofessional organization of the military may hinder overall defense capabilities and readiness, thereby eroding national security. For this reason, how to control the military, especially the top level, has become the core of discussions on civil-military relations. As the principle of civilian priority based on the Basic Law becomes widely accepted, the likelihood of the military disobeying civilian authority decreases. As a result, (liberal) democracy rooted in the rule of law has been seen as the key to solving these challenges. In theory, this provides the basis for a political system of checks and balances and a more stable social structure in which strong civilian control over the military can be achieved.
In mature democracies, most, if not all, civilian governments and politicians no longer fear outright subversion or rebellion by the military. However, society must be wary of the erosion of the rule of law and democracy. Equally important is the expectation that democratic norms will be observed within the military, from the very top to the rank and file. As democratization matures over time, soldiers are likely to accept civilian supremacy as common sense.
However, recent events show that this is not the end. In 2023, the U.S. federal government was one step closer to a government shutdown, mainly due to severe political conflict. Like other civil servants and employees, the U.S. military relies on federal funds and programs. Although closure was narrowly avoided, military officials’ trust in the political system still has a long way to go. Political deadlock, including a federal government shutdown and delays in funding and investment in defense projects, challenges the stability of civil-military relations.
A more worrying problem is that politics and national defense and security issues are becoming increasingly intertwined. As mentioned earlier, ‘guardian protection’ is fundamentally linked to the depoliticization of the military. The military must remain separate from domestic (and often international) political issues and focus solely on defense and security. This principle is exemplified in the professionalization of the military, which helps curb incentives for politicization. The problem is that the civilian side can politicize the military and create incentives for the military to politicize itself. The ability and norms of liberal democracy to prevent this in advance are highly questionable. This does not mean that liberal democracy is inherently ‘doomed to failure’, but that fair and transparent elections that guarantee individual rights have a limited role in preventing such situations.
Few would expect something like this to happen in a mature democracy, but it has already happened recently, and for others it may only be a matter of time since South Korea failed in an attempt at an autonomous coup by embattled President Yoon. December 3, 2024. President Yoon emphasized the ‘value alliance’ between liberal democratic countries and the fight against dictatorship around the world, especially in the upper half of the Korean Peninsula. However, it was he who put South Korea’s democracy and resilience to a serious test by declaring an unexpected and legally unsound martial law and dispatching elite troops to the National Assembly and the National Election Commission. Martial law was lifted by resolution of the National Assembly, but at the time of writing, the domestic political crisis is growing further.
In the United States, President Donald J. Trump has already demonstrated his will to drive out the ‘liberal left’ forces at the highest levels of the military by establishing a ‘war committee’. His main argument is that the military needs to be purged of the radical liberals and so-called “woke generals” who have been forcing “diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI)-related” programs on the military for years.
Another example is Israel. Last year, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanaihu and his coalition spearheaded controversial judicial reforms. Israel Defense Forces (IDF) reservists, particularly the air force and cyber and technology units, participated in protests against the government’s judicial reform plans, including refusing to attend training or report to reservists. Although this case is not similar to cases in the United States, where politics directly politicizes the military, Israel’s 2023 judicial reform plan clearly strengthens the incentives for politicization in the IDF sector.
As the scope of what constitutes democracy expands, examples become abundant. A number of countries labeled hybrid or illiberal democracies, including Hungary, Poland, India and Brazil, have already joined the ranks, raising concerns about the politicization of the ruling coalition and the military of its powerful leaders. In return, a politicized military would strengthen the power of the ruling civilian army. This means that stable, healthy, and depoliticized civil-military relations can only be achieved when not one, but both entities (civilian government and military) do not politicize the military. Therefore, it is most important to address the following questions: Under what conditions can the incentive to politicize the military be curbed, both for civilian governments and for the military?
The ‘second image’ of civil-military relations provides a potential answer to this. In the field of International Relations (IR), the three images sequentially represent individual actors, domestic political systems, and international systems/structures. Therefore, in the context of civil-military relations, the second image encompasses elements such as political system or structure, political situation, and political context or orientation.
While these factors all directly constitute and contribute to the motivation to politicize the military, other images have additional, exogenous or endogenous effects on the military. Although the cases mentioned above involve strong leader factors, strong leaders at the individual level do not automatically increase incentives to politicize. Additionally, the political parties and movements in question are usually larger political entities than single individual actors. What is more important is the domestic political environment in which strong leaders emerge and exercise power.
The domestic political system consists of elements such as democracy at the domestic level, federalism, and presidential system. The basic structural elements that define the basic conditions and limitations of the game include the total number of games and number of participants, as well as the overall set of rules. Domestic political systems play an important role in defining the essential parameters and constraints that determine the nature and scale of incentives to politicize the military. Low quality democracy can quickly lead to high incentives for politicization, potentially escalating into a full-blown military coup.
Factors that affect the political situation include the number of major political parties, the existence of a unified or divided government, the degree of political polarization, public opinion on government support, and the significance of the election year. The specific reward structure of the game is determined by these situational factors. Civil-military relations and related issues are influenced by the political situation prevailing at a particular time. For example, South Korea’s divided government and deepening political polarization have made it more likely that President Yoon will declare martial law to resolve the ongoing political deadlock.
Participants’ attitudes toward specific civil-military relations issues are shaped by their political orientation and the context in which they operate, giving rise to particular nuances. The former refers to the mix of populist, radical and revolutionary ideologies that are currently prominent in politics. The latter includes specific historical pathways, such as anti-communism, that shape overall perspectives and influence institutions and legal systems. When the dominant political group exhibits a dominant political orientation influenced by its social or national political situation, the severity of the problem increases, accelerating the problems of civil-military relations. This is well reflected in the case of anti-communist appeal in the case of Korea, and in the context of national (national) survival and right-wing populism in the case of Israel.
After a brief analysis of the second image of civil-military relations, the ongoing question surrounding the connection between civil-military relations can be rephrased as “How do we protect guardians and owners?”
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