Moldova’s President Maia Sandu was re-elected on November 3 following allegations of Russian election interference. Eleanor Notes With parliamentary elections scheduled for next year, Moscow is bracing for further attempts to overthrow democracy, he wrote.
In recent weeks, Moldova has held three elections: the EU referendum, the first round of presidential elections on October 20, and a presidential runoff on November 3. It is no coincidence that the first round of voting and the EU referendum are scheduled for the same day, 20 October 2024. The clash was aimed at boosting voter turnout for incumbent President Maia Sandu.
High stakes and narrow margins
The EU referendum was won on a knife-edge with 50.35% of the vote. This was only 10,564 more votes than the ‘no’ option. In short, Sandu gambled his right to remain in office in a referendum that ended just barely.
Meanwhile, the Sandu government has publicly stated that it has no ‘Plan B’ other than winning the referendum. Just as the Sandu regime characterizes Moldova’s EU membership as “existential”, so too do its commitments.
The Sandu campaign had never planned a second round of elections, hoping to win the first round with more than 50% of the vote. Throughout the first-round campaign, it was unclear who Sandu would face in the runoff.
Various pro-Russian opposition groups were competing for this position. This included Aleksandr Stoianoglo, the candidate of the main pro-Russian opposition party, the Socialist Party of Moldova (PSRM). This included other emerging parties, minor parties, and independent candidates.
Many of these candidates have obvious or less obvious ties to Moldovan fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor. Shor is responsible for ‘stealing $1 billion’ from the Moldovan banking system in 2014. He is also responsible for purchasing large-scale votes through Russian funds in the 2024 presidential election and the 2023 local elections in Moldova.
Renato Usatîi, the former mayor of Bălşi, Russia’s second-largest city in Moldova, is also worth mentioning as a populist and possible finalist contender. In the end, Usatîi took third place in the first round with 13.79% of the votes, compared to that obtained by Sandu, who received 42.49 votes (8.5% short of no runoff), and her opponent Stoianogo in the runoff. 25.95%.
Sandu vs Stoianoglo
Ahead of the finals, there were notable differences between Sandu and Stoianoglo. For example, Sandu has consistently condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and has highlighted Russia as the biggest threat to Moldova’s security and safety. She also consistently criticized “criminal agents” in Moldova who seek to “do Moscow’s dirty work on the ground” and support Russia’s attempts to undermine Moldovan democracy and undermine the country through hybrid warfare “where the battlefield is everywhere” .
On the other hand, Stoianoglo avoided a clear stance on a full-scale invasion by Russia. As Cristian Canśâr emphasized, Stoianoglo passively talks about the war and the Sandu regime, which imposed sanctions on Russia, as if it were provoking conflict. Representative Stoianoglo also called for a reset of relations with Russia. One might ask whether such a reset is possible when Russia’s end goal is not a normal relationship with an equal Moldova, but a relationship in which Moldova is subservient to Moscow.
Even in terms of anti-corruption, Sandu and Stoianoglo look quite different. While progress has been slow and stagnant, Sandu has always stood on a clear platform of pursuing anti-corruption and judicial reform. In contrast, Stoianoglo was a top prosecutor until he was released pending a criminal investigation and later fired by Sandu on corruption charges. At this moment Stoianoglo decided to return to politics.
Buy Vote with Hybrid Warfare Strategy
What is clear is the scale and speed with which Ilan Shor and the Kremlin’s financial support will buy votes in Moldova’s 2024 presidential election. This strategy has been tried and tested in the 2023 local elections in Moldova. It is highly likely that it will be further strengthened ahead of the 2025 general elections.
The amount Russia is willing to invest in Moldovan vote buying amounts to approximately $100 million. Importantly, Shore has enabled the Kremlin to change the way it influences Moldovan politics. Rather than trying to influence political parties, politicians, and the Moldovan media, there has been a shift toward directly bribing voters. And doing so has been very effective.
Ziarul de Gardă’s devastating investigative reporting exposed Shor’s plan to bribe 130,000 people ahead of the first round of the presidential election. At the same time, some of these investments took the form of loans rather than financial gifts, and people realized they had unknowingly applied for credit.
Nor is this the entirety of Shor’s attempts to influence Moldovan politics. Last October, U.S. Senator Ben Cardin sent a letter to Meta and Google CEOs urging them to step up efforts to curb Shore’s influence. Cardin noted that Shor spent “$33,000 on Facebook ads in June 2024 alone and more than $400,000 since he was sanctioned in October 2022.”
Elections and the pursuit of influence buying are therefore a significant part of the Kremlin’s hybrid war against Moldova. Critically, the Kremlin, through Shor, seeks to undermine anti-corruption reforms in Moldova by undermining democracy, undermining trust, and investing in crime.
Ahead of the Moldova general elections
At the same time, the scale of vote buying should not overwhelm criticism of PAS, Sandu’s party, which is also part of the government and holds the majority of seats in the Moldovan parliament (62 out of 101).
In 2025, Moldova will hold parliamentary elections. And Moldova’s parliamentary public makes this election more important than this year’s presidential election, at least domestically. Even though it has been a few days since the presidential election ended, people have already moved on to the next challenge: the National Assembly elections. Of course, Russia will likely exert influence in this election through Shor. A candidate who fits their interests is likely to win the seat.
The Moldovan diaspora appeared in never-before-seen numbers and contributed significantly to Sandu’s re-election. This effect comes despite Shor chartering planes to transport people from Russia to Türkiye and Belarus. However, the Moldovan diaspora is likely to be less mobilized in parliamentary elections, and its effectiveness is likely to be weakened by Moldova’s electoral landscape.
Beyond vote buying, we must face the reality that the public is frustrated and disappointed with PAS and that time for change is limited ahead of the general election. In Ziarul de Gardă in October, Petru Grozavu accused PAS of being “out of touch with reality” and governing in a “non-transparent” way, and of politicians being too “arrogant” and indifferent to performance. After the presidential election, PAS promised a cabinet reshuffle and more judicial reforms, but it is not yet known what this will look like.
Moldovan society was not only frustrated but existentially scared by Russia’s all-out invasion of its neighbor. They want a government that listens better, responds better, realizes that it is the economic challenges and social consequences of migration that unite people, and promises not only reasons for hope but opportunities for that optimism to be channeled.
In addition to Shore’s political parties, other political parties are also waiting. Populist Renato Usatii may seek to become a coalition partner if given the opportunity.
Then there is the new political party MAN (“Mişcarea Alternativă Natională”), to which Ion Ceban, mayor of Moldova’s capital Chisinau, belongs. Ceban is a communist, turned socialist, centrist, neutralist, populist, independent politician and mayor. Mainly, he is trying to leverage his vision and success to aesthetically modernize Chisinau. In next year’s parliamentary elections, he will likely seek to expand the party’s influence outside Chisinau.
Whether PAS should continue to participate in government or form a coalition with another party seems like a very real question right now. Meanwhile, the pro-European opposition in PAS continues to operate in the league under mainstream politics. Perhaps the presidential election alone will be enough to get the gears of PAS rolling and ready to compete as the ruling party in next year’s parliamentary elections.
Ukraine as a “shield” of Moldova
Lastly, there is the geopolitical reality of where Moldova is located. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has put Moldova more on the West’s radar, and the country is playing a larger role in international politics than ever before. But Moldova is more influenced by what happens outside than it is able to influence international political changes.
The common discourse in Moldova is that Ukraine is Moldova’s “shield.” Whatever happens in Ukraine will have more serious ramifications for Moldova than for any other country.
And there is uncertainty about President Trump’s election. Trump’s positive attitude toward Putin provides some clues, but it is unclear how the Trump administration will handle Ukraine. We know much less how the Trump administration will deal with Moldova. Meanwhile, the post of U.S. ambassador to Chisinau will remain vacant beyond June 2024, giving President Trump an early opportunity to appoint his preferred candidate. It will be Europe that will fill this gap politically, geopolitically and economically. And we, especially Ukraine and Moldova, have no time left.
Imagine the unlikely scenario that the Trump administration puts an end to all-out Russian aggression (i.e., full restoration of territory within its internationally recognized borders) that might be to Ukraine’s liking. Such a scenario would not mean an end to Russia’s hybrid war against Moldova or Shor’s related attempts to overthrow Moldova’s democracy. There is no indication that Russia is willing to give up its dark threats against Moldova for any reason other than surrender.
Note: This article gives the views of the author and not the position of EUROPP (European Politics and Policy) or the London School of Economics. Main image source: Victor Mogildea /Shutterstock.com
