Friends with Benefits: The Indo-American Story
By Seema Sirohi
HarperCollins, 2023
Friends with Benefits: The Indo-American Storywritten by Indian journalist Seema Sirohi, is part history, part journalistic memoir. It describes the remarkable evolution of US-India relations from adversarial to partnership under five US presidents and three Indian prime ministers. With. India and the United States: Marginalized democraciesIn a book published in 1994, Dennis Kux wrote a history of the country’s complex and difficult relationship with the United States. He highlighted the anomaly in the confrontational nature of interactions among nine successive U.S. presidents, from Franklin Delano Roosevelt to George W. Bush, that too often took on a confrontational nature. Seema Sirohi picks up where she left off and chronicles the reverse evolution of their relationship from Bill Clinton to Joe Biden.
India came out of the Cold War on the wrong side of history but decided to change course and move closer to the United States. It took a little longer for Washington to feel the change and begin to act on it. Perhaps more than anything else, Bill Clinton’s presidency is a prime example of a shift in US policy toward India. The relationship went from being overtly hostile to a passionate reconciliation. However, the author makes it very clear that India’s policy has changed much less than that of the United States. Throughout Bill Clinton’s first term and his second, Pakistan and non-proliferation issues dominated the relationship. American misunderstanding of South Asia’s political and security dynamics, Cold War reminiscences of past alliances, and highly effective lobbying on the Pakistani side have made resolving the Kashmir issue the focus of U.S. policy in South Asia.
Pakistan’s nuclear tests followed India’s in 1998, heightening tensions. The sanctions against India were brutal. The United States has refused to consider Pakistan-China nuclear collusion despite all the evidence. Islamabad’s level of diplomacy played an important role in this situation, but Chinese economic considerations played a bigger role than Pakistan’s. It took the 1999 Kargil War for Bill Clinton to change course and reconsider America’s relations with Pakistan and India. Kargil opened the eyes of many Americans to broader engagement with India, whose economy is slowly but effectively becoming more important and attractive. Nonetheless, the nuclear test itself convinced the US administration that it could no longer ignore India. A series of discussions between Strobe Talbott and Jaswant Singh paved the way for reconciliation. According to Sirohi, the China issue was also becoming more prominent, but became somewhat ambiguous as the United States absorbed Clinton’s willingness to cooperate economically with China, which was soon to join the WTO.
Reconciliation first emerged at the turn of the century, when the first US president visited India since Jimmy Carter in 2000. India’s foreign policy was entering a new era. But it was under new President George W. Bush that the relationship blossomed. During his first term, relations developed significantly as American interests suddenly and dramatically increased in the wake of Pakistan-sponsored terrorism and the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States. With India. Although formally announced in 2005, the gradual unhyphenation between the US administration’s Pakistan and India policies, which began during Bush’s first term, enabled a more ambitious policy centered around the idea that India could play a greater role in emerging countries. I did. Twenty-first century.
These policies were crystallized during President Bush’s second term through the U.S.-India civil nuclear agreement. Announced in 2005, the bill set off a massive administrative battle in Washington that resulted in India alone overturning decades of non-proliferation policy and completely changing the paradigm of relations. Nonetheless, it took a lot of persuasion to convince Indian leaders to approve it. The relationship has changed since the Bush years, anchored by new and dramatic public support in both countries. The view put forward by Seema Sirohi here echoes earlier views, especially in India, which was one of the very few countries where George W. Bush remained popular despite the Iraq war.
In contrast, Sirohi presents the relationship under Barack Obama as a step backwards. Immediately after Obama’s election, India-US relations seemed to revert to the bad old days. The administration’s initial rhetoric shifted back to a pro-Pakistan narrative in Washington, trade difficulties were further compounded, and scandals flourished. Personal factors also played a role, starting with the complex and strong personalities of actors such as Richard Holbrooke and John Kerry. Their undeniable talent seemed to be matched by an equal ignorance of South Asian realities. Meanwhile, Barack Obama, despite his personal sympathy for Manmohan Singh, was not really invested in relations with India. With Narendra Modi coming to power, something the author welcomes, a new actor has emerged. While he was deeply aware of his country’s structural weaknesses, he was determined to use the American system to his advantage to help change the situation. Again, China helped maintain the relationship. Military cooperation has progressed centered on the Beijing issue.
If Obama’s presidency had been a period of relative stagnation in India-US relations, things could have changed in quite bizarre ways. Donald Trump is paradoxical in Sirohi’s view of the U.S. president’s re-election and relationship with India. His personal way of thinking was perhaps the most alien to anything India could have imagined. However, his presidency was generally viewed as positive for relations with India. New Delhi succeeded thanks to circumstances, smart diplomacy, and the cooperation of some knowledgeable people within the U.S. administration. In contrast to the situation that prevailed under Clinton, the Pakistan factor, now exacerbated by Afghanistan, is no longer alleviated by the need to pressure China to join the WTO. If anything, the tariff war with China has made not only the alliance with Pakistan but also duplicity in Afghanistan more difficult to accept. Of course, Trump could not refrain from repeatedly attacking India over its tariff policy. But the smart and knowledgeable advisors at the NSC were able to compensate for the simple and ill-conceived outbursts of the US president, while Indian diplomats cunningly used Trump’s family and romantic connections to influence him. Trump’s presidency has therefore turned out to be a net benefit for India.
But the relationship appears to have stalled as Joe Biden’s first term draws to a close. India and the US are no longer apart. This relationship is not even comparable to the situation that prevailed in the early Clinton years. But it’s still uncertain. Misunderstandings of the past have disappeared, but new difficulties have emerged. While both countries are still turning their backs and emphasizing democratic convergence, current political trends in India are increasingly making India’s friends uneasy. As the author argues, “issues about shared values and human rights can create new stresses” (p. 461). Strategic convergence on China remains the main glue between the two countries, but political dynamics on both sides could strain relations once again.
friends with benefits It provides interesting insights into New Delhi’s diplomacy. Indian diplomats and politicians learned to use the American political system much faster than American diplomats and politicians used the Indian political system. The book highlights the flexibility of the American political system, which is constantly in conflict between competing interest groups and influences and unclear about the reality of the world it polices pretend to be. But it also highlights the decisive role of the American president in foreign policy. Relations with India changed during the Clinton era and prospered during the Bush era because both men were personally involved and unusually active. The stagnation occurred because the successors, despite their public appearances, demonstrated a relative lack of personal interest.
The book also provides the most accurate account of Narendra Modi’s foreign policy. In essence, the Indian Prime Minister is marching resolutely in the footsteps of his predecessors who largely defined the contours of India’s foreign policy since 1992. But he also proved capable of surprisingly innovative tactics while skillfully leveraging American systems and leadership. In the process, he has obscured perceptions of his regime of questionable values through unflinching, modern narratives about the economy, technology, and strategic proximity to the United States.
For those interested in the history of relations between the two countries Friends with Benefits: The Indo-American Story It is a well of information, full of insights and anecdotes. Sirohi’s perceptions and understandings, passions, disillusionments, and occasional anger are palpable throughout the book. But they never take precedence over the history she witnessed and which is also her history. But it is not entirely without bias. The narrative of American-Indian history is written from an Indian perspective, and the author does not always hide her biases. The book would have been better served by a larger and deeper contextualization. The constraints of the existing global superpower are necessarily different from those of the emerging powers of the time, but they are not adequately addressed. But this lack of objectivity (not to be confused with a lack of honesty) makes the book interesting. Moreover, the author’s subtle but constant presence and her sense of humor make the book an easy and enjoyable read. In a long line of publications on India and the United States, Friends with Benefits: The Indo-American Story Striking. By all accounts, this book is a must-read.
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