Previous research has shown that people often have similar political preferences to their parents. Based on new research, Stuart J. Turnbull-Dugarte While this may be true across the board, it shows that lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB) individuals from Conservative-voting families are much more likely to form political attachments independently of their parents.
“The apple does not fall far from the tree” is an old English proverb that indicates that important traits between parents and children are of an intergenerational nature. This saying often applies to the increasingly tribal nature of politics. On average, voters tend to have similar ideological preferences as their parents, and the same goes for voting behavior. If your parents voted Conservative, you are, on average, more likely to do the same. do.
The genetic nature of political orientation is often viewed as a function of two processes that are not mutually exclusive. On the one hand, partisanship and political views can be ingrained in children through parents’ direct and explicit actions. According to the theory, this route assumes that partisan loyalties and political preferences are important enough for parents to consciously raise their children to imitate these attachments.
A second, less direct mechanism occurs through the socioeconomic status and sociocultural identity that children share with their parents. Families that vote Conservative via this route have children who vote Conservative, not because they teach Conservative loyalty at home, but because the structurally equivalent route that makes their parents conservative is likely to apply to their children as well. That is, sharing the same socioeconomic and sociocultural identity as our parents and communities makes us act and believe (politically) in similar ways to them.
This parent-child political transmission assumeHowever, salient social identities are also shared across generations. In most cases this is true. Black parents have black children, children of working-class parents are born into working-class families, and practicing Catholics tend to baptize their children. But not all identities span generations. Heterosexual and cisgender parents have children who identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual, nonbinary, transgender, queer, and other gender non-affirming identities (LGBTQ+).
Figure 1: LGBTQ+ identity as a (non-genetic) social identity.
Note: For more information, see the author’s accompanying (open access) paper in the Journal of European Public Policy.
As previous research has demonstrated, being LGBTQ+ creates unique political preferences, and LGBTQ+ citizens are more likely to place a premium on policy preferences such as economic redistribution and more liberal immigration policies, regardless of economic status. Heterosexual. Do you take over these? non-genetic Does social identity, including one’s outgroup socialization process, impede the intergenerational transmission of political orientation and electoral choices?
In a recent study I attempted to evaluate this. I asked: Do queer voters who harbor significant acquired social identities do the same? out Did you deviate politically from your parents at home? Using excellent data from the British Election Study, I tested whether LGB voters share the same party preferences as their parents, and whether their odds of doing so are similar to those observed for heterosexuals from the same partisan households.
Figure 2: Distribution of voting preferences by parental partisanship and sexual orientation.
Note: For more information, see the author’s accompanying (open access) paper in the Journal of European Public Policy.
Key findings are visually summarized in Figure 2. First, looking at individuals whose parents voted for the Labor Party, we found that more than half (52%) of heterosexuals in families who voted for the Labor Party voted for the socially liberal parties Labor and Liberal. Democratic Party and Green Party. This percentage is much lower than what was observed among LGB voters. Among LGB-identifying individuals at Labor polling stations, 70% voted for the same socially liberal party. Focusing on parents who vote Labor, the results suggest that LGB people are more likely to inherit their parents’ partisan attachments, and that it is heterosexual voters who are, if anything, more inclined to shift away from their allegiance to the Labor Party. their parents.
When we consider the dynamics of households that vote Conservative, these dynamics are dramatically reversed. Among heterosexuals, two in three (66%) voters whose parents voted Conservative will vote Conservative. Among heterosexuals, rates of hereditary partisanship are noticeably higher than those seen among parents who voted Labor, consistent with evidence of greater left-wing volatility. LGB people from these conservative families are 32% less likely to vote for the same political party as their parents. This difference can be explained in part by the fact that LGB voters express feeling more politically distant from their parents’ party when their parents voted Conservative (see Figure 3).
Figure 3: LGB people feel further removed from the politics of their (conservative) parents.Note: Please see the author’s attached (open access) paper for further details. European Journal of Public Policy
In several additional tests in this study, I also demonstrated that the gender gap in genetic partisanship exists for both men and women, but is four times larger for lesbians and bisexual women than for gay and bisexual men. On average, the probability of voting for the same political party as their parents is 12 percentage points lower for gay/bisexual men, while the difference between heterosexual and non-heterosexual women is 41 percentage points.
In terms of our understanding of political sociology, these findings challenge traditional notions of intergenerational political transmission, highlighting the political agency of LGBTQ+ identity acquisition and the disruptive role of LGBTQ+ identities on the transmission of political values within the home. LGBTQ+ individuals break away from (conservative) political norms within their families and contribute to diversifying the political preferences of an emerging left-leaning group.
Although LGBTQ+ individuals are a minority compared to cisgender heterosexuals, ~ no Numerical limitations: among young groups Self-identified LGBTQ+ individuals make up 20% of the population. Not only are LGBTQ+ individuals politically distinct from their heterosexual peers, but they also differ significantly from their parents, especially those who align with the political right. The consequences of this generational variation therefore suggest that a significant proportion of households voting Conservative may not be able to provide the organic generational voter turnover that Britain’s main right-wing parties might hope for.
Please see the author’s attached (open access) paper for more details. European Journal of Public Policy
Note: This article gives the views of the author and not the position of EUROPP (European Politics and Policy) or the London School of Economics. Featured image credit: Khakimullin Aleksandr / Shutterstock.com