Pegida, a far-right populist movement, disbanded after its final protest on October 20. Sabine Volk With the far right performing strongly in opinion polls, there remain many avenues for disillusioned German voters to express their views, he wrote.
On October 20, more than a thousand far-right protesters, hundreds of left-wing counter-demonstrators and dozens of police gathered in downtown Dresden. Pegida, Germany’s largest far-right protest group and one of the most prominent far-right street movements in Europe, celebrated its 10th anniversary in 2014 by inviting people to the city for what was described as its final protest.
Non-violent events included movement leaders such as former Austrian vice-president Heinz-Christian Strache, Alternative for Germany (AfD) politician Bjorn Höcke, identitarian Martin Sellner, and “intellectuals” Götz Kubitschek and Jurgen Elsässer.
If Lutz Bachmann, the leader of the Pegida, can be trusted (and in this case he probably can), this was the end of an era. After 250 protests since 2014, he and his colleagues decided to stop their street activities for health and financial reasons. But there are open questions about what Pegida’s legacy will be.
10 consecutive years of activity
Pegida, or “European Patriots Against the Islamization of the West,” emerged in Dresden in 2014, less than a year before the so-called European migration crisis. Unexpectedly, the group has amassed a large following, with around 25,000 people participating in protests in January 2015 against immigration, the visibility of Islam in Germany and the influence of “elites”. In 2016, Pegida co-founded the ‘Fortress Europe’ alliance and staged protests across Europe.
After 2016, Pegida lost importance in the protest environment, but it never disappeared. Even in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, when street protests were banned for a while, the Dresden group found a way to mobilize in ‘virtual protest events’ through YouTube. Outside of Europe, Pegida descendants agitated against Islam.
The secret to Pegida’s longevity was the ritualization of protest events. Since 2015, Pegida’s highly standardized protests have been dense and symbolic events. At the heart of the group’s demonstration calendar was its annual anniversary event, which, like its 10th anniversary event in 2024, brings in international guest speakers and attracts much larger crowds.
The extreme right has not disbanded.
After a decade of activity, many see the demise of Pegida as good news for the local and national protest scene, if not for German democracy as a whole. Although largely non-violent, anti-immigrant groups have become radicalized in recent years, adopting more extreme anti-establishment rhetoric. In 2021, the Ministry of Information officially declared it ‘anti-constitutional’.
But the fall of Pegida does not mean the decline of the German far right. The far right is quite the opposite, as it has moved from the streets into parliament over the past few years. It has now become a significant electoral force. In the 2024 regional and European elections, the Alternative for Germany emerged as the most or second most powerful party in the country. The AfD currently has several strongholds, particularly in the eastern region that formed the former German Democratic Republic.
paving the way for far-right party politics
Despite Pegida’s participation in protests declining since 2016, its impact on the country cannot be underestimated. Pegida’s activism has made racist and anti-elitist positions and rhetoric more socially acceptable in public discourse.
The fact that the protest organizers and protesters were not from the organized extreme right made their claims seem representative of the ‘centre’ of German society. Massive media coverage of Pegida’s case served to amplify racist discourse and mainstream it throughout the media landscape.
Pegida normalized far-right positions, paving the way for the rise of the AfD. The AfD was originally founded as a neoliberal, anti-euro party, but since the movement began in 2015, some leading figures within the party have claimed that it is a “natural ally” with Pegida. The party was divided with pro-Pegida over this issue. Camp won the argument. The AfD was soon dominated by the radical right, and nevertheless scored highly in opinion polls due to its stances like the far-right Pegida.
Germany’s thriving far-right protest environment
Even without Pegida, disillusioned Germans continue to operate protest media, especially in the east. During the COVID-19 pandemic, numerous anti-lockdown and anti-vaccination groups, many of which support conspiracy theories, have mushroomed across the country, especially in smaller cities.
Many of these groups did not disband once pandemic restrictions ended, but they moved on with the changing times. For example, in the context of Russia’s war in Ukraine, people participated in anti-American or anti-NATO protests. They take to the streets in a ritualistic manner similar to Pegida. They often hold protests on Mondays, like Pegida, and organize through social media platforms like Telegram.
What comes after Pegida?
Pegida’s motto was “We came to stay, and we stay until we win.” But does the group’s demise mean they’ve won or given up? From a far-right perspective, one could argue that Pegida has been defeated. The “Islamization” of Germany they perceive is still ongoing, and the fact that Germany is currently ruled by a left-wing government constitutes a failure at all levels. Perhaps this is why Bachmann announced a sinister “new form” of mobilization.
As a result, from a liberal democratic perspective, it can be argued that Pegida has won. Earlier this year, Germany’s left-wing government reintroduced border controls to limit migration flows into Germany, as called for by Pegida a decade ago. The European Union (EU) is also considering ways to strengthen its external borders.
But in other policy areas, Germany and Europe are slowly moving in a more progressive political direction, including promoting minority rights. Pegida and its allies around the world are still not happy. Let’s hope they don’t start another cycle of protests.
Note: This article gives the views of the author and not the position of EUROPP (European Politics and Policy) or the London School of Economics. Main image source: lukaszek /Shutterstock.com
