From Sarajevo, 1914, to Munich, 1938, historical analogies provide cognitive shortcuts that help us understand complex problems, allowing policymakers to make decisions with at least a minimal level of original analysis. In no field is this trend more evident than in the study of China-US relations. In this field, scholars have alternately sought to understand and shape the world’s most important bilateral relationship by referring to the past. But for the most part, direct and overwhelmingly Western-centric historical analogies have proven more likely to obscure and confuse rather than illuminate and guide assessments of U.S.-China relations. What is more worrying is that because the most common metaphors are drawn from past wars, the irresistible appeal of these metaphors risks creating a self-fulfilling dynamic that brings countries closer to conflict.
Graham Allison’s popularization of the ‘Thucydides Trap’ frames US-China relations by leveraging the timeless dynamic of an emerging power (China) threatening an established power (the United States). Just as Sparta’s fear of the rise of Athens made the Peloponnesian War ‘inevitable,’ Allison argues that China’s rise as an economic and military rival to American hegemony will push the two countries into a violent confrontation. The framework has had enormous influence in foreign policy circles, with Joe Biden describing Allison as “one of the most astute observers of international affairs” and Xi Jinping repeatedly citing the need to avoid the Thucydides Trap.
However, the prevalence of Allison’s theory among practitioners is consistent with his colleagues’ enthusiastic attacks on the Thucydides Trap concept and its application to Sino-American relations. Classical scholars have argued that this system resulted from a misreading of Peloponnesian history, while other commentators have disputed its underlying causal mechanism, arguing that wars were more likely to be initiated by aspiring powers than by established powers. . Other critics argue that the “Thuchydienian cliché” exaggerates China’s power while minimizing the geopolitical significance of Sino-American economic interdependence and the power of U.S. regional alliances. American strategic hawks have also joined the opposition, rejecting Allison’s prescription to “accommodate” China, arguing that China’s aggressive stance was prompted by a distracted rather than a coercive United States.
Allison is not alone in her efforts to change history to suit Sino-American relations (and vice versa). Drawing on the same theory of hegemonic war, many commentators have drawn worrying comparisons between the pre-1914 US-China relationship and the Anglo-German rivalry. Like modern China, the German Empire was a rising “revisionist power” rapidly expanding its navy to challenge its established rivals. For regional domination. Through this lens, the economic interdependence of China and the United States acts less as a preventer of future conflict than as yet another eerie similarity to pre-1914 Europe. But by ignoring Russia’s role in pushing Germany into war, this analogy misses the importance of China’s less dangerous geopolitical context, which protects China from realistic threats of invasion. Moreover, the Anglo-German analogy overlooks the role of nuclear deterrence in modern international relations and underestimates the historical contingency of Europe’s “sleepwalking” into war in July 1914.
Due to the recent deterioration of relations between the US and China, we have also witnessed the spread of the ‘Cold War’ metaphor, in which China replaces the Soviet Union as the main ideological and geopolitical adversary of the United States. However, reflecting China’s long-standing desire to learn from the Soviet Union’s mistakes, This analogy also fails to capture the modern relationship between the two countries. Indeed, while China’s authoritarian state-led capitalism’s challenge to Washington’s model of liberal democracy ostensibly mimics the clash of ideologies between the United States and the Soviet Union, China lacks the universalist ideology that shaped Cold War dynamics. The depth of cultural and economic connections between the United States and China also differs significantly from the two-pronged structure of the Cold War relationship, and despite its growing “unrestricted partnership” with Russia, China lacks the Soviet Union’s system of international alliances. Crucially, Cold War metaphors may lead to cognitive biases that exaggerate the malicious intent of both sides and mistake “security-seeking” behavior for “power-seeking” ambitions.
So should we refrain from making comparisons and declare that the U.S.-China relationship is unprecedented? Certainly, each country’s claim to exceptionalism reflects its uniqueness. While the reemergence of the “America First” ideology under President Trump clearly challenges the notion of America’s “civilizing mission,” the United States’ status as a “special nation” with a “special role to play in human history” will shape foreign policy under Biden. continues to be prevalent. . At the same time, an ongoing, albeit evolving, awareness of China’s historical destiny as a great power dominates Xi Jinping’s approach to international relations. There is also a recognition on both sides of the Pacific that the quantitative scale of Central American global dominance is qualitatively unique. Together, the United States and China account for 43% of the world’s total GDP and more than half of global military spending, and their combined contribution to CO2 emissions far exceeds that of their closest competitors. But the relationship between the two countries cannot defy all comparisons simply because its protagonists consider themselves unique or possess unprecedented resources. In fact, the historical analogy persists even among those who appreciate the special nature of the U.S.-China relationship. For example, Niall Ferguson’s ‘Chimerica’ fantasy of interdependence among nations is implicitly reminiscent of Nichibei, a reflection of America’s fears of Japanese hegemony in the 1980s. triggered.
If the appeal of the metaphor for U.S.-China relations cannot be overcome, it can be improved on at least three aspects. First, U.S.-China commentators should utilize a broader repertoire of analogies to avoid cognitive bias. For example, they might consider whether there was an Anglo-French naval proliferation in 1919.Day The century is a better comparison than the Anglo-German arms race, or whether Cold War metaphors are best suited to the United States reimagined in the role of the Soviet Union. Second, analogies should focus on the underlying mechanisms that led to historical change rather than on the protagonists of the past. For example, as Ian Chong and Todd Hall point out, 1914 conveys useful lessons about complex alliance systems, rising nationalism, and the dangers of persistent crisis without the need for direct comparisons between the German Empire and China. Finally, when drawing analogies, commentators should avoid the unfounded but persistent assumption that Europe’s past will be Asia’s future and look to precedents across the Asia-Pacific region. The result may be fewer book sales, but it may also slow the march to war.
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