At the end of 2016, toward the end of his presidency, Barack Obama visited Berlin for the final time. At a private dinner, he implored his longtime partner, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, to preserve his international legacy and the broader transatlantic partnership of liberal democracies amid the turmoil expected to result from Trump’s election. Against the backdrop of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and invasion of Donbas, Britain’s withdrawal from the European Union, and widespread populist upheaval across the continent, Merkel’s Germany seemed like the last bastion of political stability. The European Union (EU) is the world’s fourth largest economy, a stable democracy, and a proven multilateral leader. After 12 years in office, the Prime Minister has more government experience than any of his colleagues in the EU. In 2015, Time magazine named her not just Person of the Year, but “Prime Minister of the Free World.”
Although the title was uncomfortable, Merkel reluctantly accepted the assignment. While many Western leaders were vying feverishly for Trump’s favor, she offered him “close cooperation,” but explicitly on the basis of shared fundamental values such as democracy, freedom, respect for the law and human dignity. She worked with Trump because, as she later said, “every German chancellor has a vested interest in working and talking to the American president.” But she refused to submit to his purely transactional style of politics. Merkel, who modeled a response to Trump’s deal, saw the intrinsic value of alliances and partnerships and worked to preserve them despite active opposition or outright obstruction from Washington. Therefore, she maintained the Iran nuclear deal. The Plan of Action (JCOPA) was suspended after Washington’s withdrawal. She held the EU together despite Trump’s attempts to divide and rule. More controversially, she shielded Germany’s ambiguous economic partnerships with Russia and China from growing criticism.
During Trump’s presidency, Germany’s international leadership was much more popular around the world than that of the United States. However, the Germans back home were very reluctant to take a leading role. As soon as Trump left, Merkel happily handed the baton of leadership back to Washington. Marking the event, President Biden thanked her for “an exemplary life of groundbreaking service to Germany and a life of sincere service to the world.” Biden could quickly undo some of the damage Trump did. He rejoined the Paris Agreement on climate change, strengthened the transatlantic alliance and breathed new life into seemingly obscure formats such as the Transatlantic Quad. In time, these will prove to be important tools of American leadership in organizing the Western response to Russian aggression against Ukraine.
But despite his achievements, Biden has not been able to completely reverse the causes and consequences of Trump’s policies. Whether it is gradual, intermittent, or sudden, Trump’s return to the White House demonstrates a broader shift in American politics. International role: Already, the president-elect is busy ignoring long-standing partnerships, threatening to ignore alliance commitments, pledging to withdraw U.S. support for Ukraine and hinting at merging NATO partners. Just as the West faces the greatest threat to its freedom and security in decades, its traditional leaders appear to be derailing.
Liberal democracies in Europe and around the world must step up to meet the challenge posed by an aggressive Russia and an assertive China. Once again, “the world America created” (Kagan) needs stewards. However, unlike Trump’s first term, what lies ahead is not just a hiatus, but may also be the beginning of the end of ‘liberal hegemony’ (Eikenberry). The structural majority of the free world appears to be shifting from liberal internationalism to nativist isolationism. A return to liberal internationalist policies within four years is almost impossible. And through this period of change, a promising candidate to lead the West was tragically lost.
Eight years after Obama dined with Merkel, Joe Biden also flew to Berlin. Observers testify that he has a solid working relationship with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz. In 2023, Biden offered Scholz a political excuse for his controversial decision to send main battle tanks to Ukraine. The prime minister returned the favor, agreeing to release a convicted murderer to Russia in exchange for the return of American political prisoners. But unlike Merkel, Scholz lacks the trust of a majority in parliament and key European partners. Moreover, his country is experiencing a severe recession, its infrastructure is collapsing, and its military is unprepared for large-scale war. It remains to be seen whether Scholz’s successor, Friedrich Merz of the Christian Democratic Party (CDU), will perform better. He may invest in repairing more important European ties and become a staunch supporter of Ukraine, but he too will suffer from Germany’s economic dependence on China, misguided energy policies and decades of neglect. army. Moreover, his party’s almost religious adherence to the so-called ‘debt brake’ will effectively prevent him from borrowing the money he needs to assume a credible leadership role.
The situation looks equally bleak in other Western capitals. In France, President Macron lost his majority in parliament. Britain’s Keir Starmer failed to capitalize on his election victory. Donald Tusk’s position in Poland was undermined by the previous government’s illiberal inheritance. Italy’s Giorgia Meloni is flirting with fascism. NATO’s Mark Rutte and the EU’s Ursula von der Leyen both lack the political independence and material power to function as effective leaders. So for now, it appears that no single country or organization can replace the United States. On his farewell visit to Berlin, Biden met not only with the German chancellor, but also with all three fellow leaders of the Transatlantic Quad: Scholz, Macron and Starmer. But while Biden has used this format very successfully in the past, Poland’s violent reaction to its exclusion from the Berlin conference effectively nullifies its value as a coordination mechanism. In any case, Trump is expected to return to his previous practice of ignoring formalities.
Perhaps more promising is the new E-5 format, comprised of France, Germany, Poland, Italy and the United Kingdom, recently convened at defense minister level in Berlin. In a follow-up statement, the five countries declared themselves “determined to lead the way in developing ideas and advancing European defense preparedness.” The foreign ministers of the five countries then met in similar circumstances with their Spanish colleagues and expressed their determination to “think and act big about European security.” German opposition leader Friedrich Merz proposed another format: a contact group comprised of Germany, France, Britain, and Poland to develop proposals for a postwar European order. To be sure, there is no shortage of “small” European initiatives vying for leadership in a post-Biden Europe. Just weeks before Donald Trump’s inauguration, this seemingly uncoordinated cacophony testifies to Europe’s worrying lack of clarity on how to address the emerging leadership vacuum. You have options, but you have to make a decision.
To be viable, any institutional arrangements that will guide the free world through the period of continued uncertainty ahead must be protected from nationalist and populist tendencies, not only in the United States but throughout the Western world. This can be most effectively ensured through a collaborative approach that is not dependent on a single actor and his or her political leanings, but is ensured by a group of key actors interested in and able to preserve the liberal order. These criteria are most parsimoniously met by the E-5 group, which brings together the five countries with the highest defense spending in Europe and five of the continent’s seven largest economies. It ties Britain into European structures around a potentially revived Franco-German axis, includes Poland as an advocate for Central and Eastern Europe, and allows Meloni’s Italy to function as a potential interlocutor with Trump.
The ultimate viability of such an organization will depend on whether its members are prepared to act not only in their own interests but also in the interests of the wider European ethos. For Germany in particular, this will entail potentially difficult financial and political choices. It remains to be seen whether the new government will be prepared to make one, as Chancellor Angela Merkel has sometimes done. But the alternative costs much more in the long run and is more likely to flip.
Additional Resources on E-International Relations
