OPINION – Could Vietnamese Hedging Prevent All-Out War in Ukraine?

When discussing foreign policy strategies available to small and medium-sized powers, IR experts tend to focus on bandwagoning and balancing, concepts popularized by scholars such as Kenneth Waltz and Randall Schweller. Bandwagoning is seen as a strategy of a weak state whose hopes of survival in a system dominated by a great power can be strengthened by being closely linked to a regional hegemon. Balancing is thought to be appropriate for intermediate states that feel confident in countering rising or revisionist powers with like-minded status quo actors. However, there is a middle path that has received little attention from academics and practitioners. This approach is called hedging and revolves around three core principles: That is, it avoids any explicit association with, as well as confrontation with, great powers. simultaneously paying homage to and rebelling against local hegemony; and diversifying diplomatic relations and economic cooperation with a wide range of regional and global actors, with the goal of avoiding dependence on any single power.

An excellent example of a successful hedging strategy is Vietnam. As a country that shares land and sea borders with China, including an ongoing territorial dispute in the South China Sea, Vietnam was expected to join the US-led balancing coalition (along with other countries in Southeast Asia). The rise of China and ensuring a rules-based order in the broader Indo-Pacific region. According to prevailing neorealist thinking, this would be a reasonable choice for Hanoi, which has ample evidence in its own history of Chinese aggression. But there are no signs that Vietnam is pursuing an external balancing strategy against North Korea’s larger neighbor. The country’s leadership remains firm on its ‘no-four’ defense policy. These include: 1. Not participating in military alliances, 2. Not siding with one country against another, 3. Not having foreign military bases on Vietnamese territory or leveraging Vietnam to counter other countries. Not using, 4. Not using or threatening force The use of force in international relations. As long as the “four major oppositions” are essential to the CPV’s party line, it is impossible for Hanoi to participate in AUKUS, QUAD or similar security partnerships.

Regarding strengthening the country’s defense capabilities, Vietnam is committed to modernizing its Soviet/Russian-based military systems and maintaining a credible deterrent. Vietnam’s total defense budget is expected to increase from $6.5 billion in 2020 to $10.2 billion by the end of 2010, according to GlobalData. Although this is a noticeably increased amount, it is still a large difference from China’s 2024 defense budget of $231.4 billion. Moreover, Hanoi’s increased defense spending is consistent with Vietnam’s overall economic growth and consistent with the country’s official foreign policy of independence, self-reliance, multilateralization and diversification. Especially the first two points. In other words, it would be unreasonable to claim that Vietnam is investing in strengthening its military to match China’s capabilities.

Against the expectations of the West, and more precisely the United States, Vietnam has clearly decided not to balance against China. There are several reasons for this strategic decision. Above all, Vietnam does not perceive China as an existential threat. The long-running feud over territorial waters and exclusive economic zones in the South China Sea is not as serious as Western observers thought or expected. Second, so far, China has not provided Vietnam and other Southeast Asian countries with strong enough incentives to create or join an anti-China coalition. However, this situation could easily change if China chooses forced unification with Taiwan. The third and fourth reasons have nothing to do with China at all and everything to do with China’s main competitor, the United States. Hanoi is tired of Washington’s persistent narrative of democracy versus authoritarianism and suspects “hostile forces” are considering regime change in Vietnam in the long term, if not in the short or medium term. Additionally, Vietnamese leaders are not persuaded by a strong American presence in the Indo-Pacific, fearing possible abandonment if the United States begins an isolationist course in the future under a re-elected Donald Trump or a like-minded presidential administration. Finally, in purely theoretical terms, Hanoi knows that a balance in China will lead to the stabilization of a bipolar order, and that polarization will inevitably lead to the creation of spheres of influence dominated by each power, leaving little behind. ) space for maneuver by small nations. Simply put, Vietnam is protecting its autonomy in international affairs by refusing to balance with China.

Too large (a country of 100 million people) and too confident (a country that had triumphed over the armies of Japan, France, and the United States) to choose to bandwagon, Vietnam chose a hedging strategy. As explained in the introduction, hedging involves equidistance from major centers of power. Additionally, due to their Taoist-Confucian cultural foundation, Vietnamese do not perceive other countries as black and white, but rather as black and white (yin and yang). This means that great powers and all other international actors are perceived simultaneously as friends and enemies, potential partners and possible threats. Accordingly, Hanoi is careful not to provoke China by becoming too friendly with the United States, while deepening economic and cultural ties with the United States and liberal democratic countries such as Korea, Japan, and Australia. Likewise, Vietnam’s leadership tacitly approves of U.S. involvement in keeping the Indo-Pacific “free and open,” while resisting U.S. overtures for closer security cooperation. Vietnam’s variant of strategic ambiguity ensured that Hanoi was courted by everyone and threatened by no one. At least not in the way that Ukraine’s very existence is threatened by Russia.

Regarding the ongoing war in Eastern Europe, Vietnam maintains neutrality following its policy of not openly opposing major powers. Abstained on four UNGA resolutions condemning Russia’s attacks on Ukraine. As expected, Russia did not recognize the illegal annexation of Ukrainian territory. Hanoi was an ally of Moscow during the Cold War, and Russia remains Vietnam’s largest arms supplier. But the similarities between China-Vietnam relations and Russia-Ukraine relations are hard to miss. In both cases there are vast asymmetries of power, as well as a long history of political domination and cultural influence by the larger state. So how did China and Vietnam successfully avoid escalation despite a protracted maritime dispute, while Russia and Ukraine became embroiled in the worst armed conflict on European soil since World War II?

From Vietnam’s perspective, it could be argued that Ukraine made a mistake when it decided to work with the West to counterbalance Russia after the Orange Revolution in 2004 (another reason why Vietnam’s ruling Communist Party fears regime change in Hanoi). The push to join the European Union and NATO, led by Presidents Viktor Yushchenko and Petro Poroshenko, is a clear sign that Ukraine wants to break away from the ‘Russian world’ and join the ‘collective West’. It was a signal. In other words, it was a zero-sum game with an advantage for Washington (Brussels was a secondary actor) and a corresponding loss for Moscow. By comparison, Hanoi always ensures that any rapprochement between Vietnam and the West or liberal democracies is not perceived as detrimental to Beijing. For example, U.S. aircraft carriers may call at Da Nang, but the U.S. Navy should not expect permission to use it as a permanent base in the South China Sea. Everything Hanoi does or does not do is intended to serve Vietnam’s national interests without disrupting the regional status quo.