Marco Siddi is a Senior Research Fellow at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs and Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Cagliari, Italy. He is also Associate Professor of World Politics at the University of Helsinki and Associate Professor of International Relations at the University of Tampere. He is a board member of the Trans European Policy Studies Association (TEPSA) and a member of the European Leadership Network. He received his PhD from the University of Edinburgh and the University of Cologne within the framework of the Marie Curie Training Network EXACT on the External Activities of the European Union. His research focuses primarily on energy politics, the politics of memory and identity, European politics, and EU-Russia relations.
His latest papers include: European energy politics: green transition and EU-Russia energy relations (Edward Elgar, 2023) and European identity and foreign policy discourse on Russia: from Ukraine to the Syrian crisis. (Routledge, 2020). He also co-edited the volume. Historical memory and foreign policy (Palgrave Macmillan, 2022). His research has been published in some of the world’s leading academic journals, including: European Journal of Public Policy, Geopolitics, Euro-Asian Studies, Journal of European Integration, International Spectators, German Politics, Politics and Governance, International Politics. He has written policy analyzes for LSE EUROPP, OpenDemocracy and the European Leadership Network, as well as several European think tanks.
Where does the most interesting research/debate occur in your field?
There are so many exciting developments, it’s hard to even keep track and summarize them. The green transition in energy and climate politics has enormous social consequences that we are only just beginning to explore. Concepts such as security, justice and sustainability are highly controversial and are increasingly difficult to discuss ‘independently’ as they become increasingly interconnected. In the field of international relations more broadly, the continuing shift of economic and political power from the North to the South, or at least to some of the countries in this second group, is perhaps the most relevant development. These changes should not be exaggerated or idealized, but they deserve critical attention.
Conversely, EU-Russia and West-Russia relations, one of my main areas of interest and expertise, have become very depressing to study. That doesn’t mean the topic is interesting. It’s just that it will be very difficult to deal with negative developments after 2022. Meanwhile, analyzing the Russia-Ukraine conflict and its numerous ramifications requires solid expertise.
How has the way you understand the world changed over time, and what (or who) prompted the most significant changes in your thinking?
The most important empirical development in my field of expertise was the 2022 Russian attack on Ukraine. In saying this, I do not want to claim that this was a unique event, as many Western-centric analysts have claimed. Other parts of the world, including Yemen and the Gaza Strip, have seen more civilian casualties. What I mean is that the Russia-Ukraine war has had the deepest impact on my field of expertise, EU-Russia relations and energy politics. This, along with the increasing US-China rivalry and geopolitical rivalry between great powers, has also shifted, at least in the West, from a liberal paradigm that celebrates international free trade and interdependence to a more focused focus on strategic autonomy, economic separation from competitors (perceived and real), and self-reliance. It’s a realistic approach. This is one of the key issues I analyzed in my recent book on European energy politics.
Why is it important for the EU to become self-reliant in the green energy transition?
For the EU and the rest of the world, achieving a low-carbon energy transition in the shortest possible time is of paramount importance. Because the impacts of climate change are devastating and we are only just getting started. Without a global green transition, the damage will soon become irreparable. Multilateralism and international cooperation to achieve a global energy transition will be the best and most efficient way to combat climate change. There are studies and scenarios that clearly show this. If the green energy transition becomes as much of a geopolitical playing field as it is now, the next best course of action for the EU is to ensure that it is not too vulnerable to external supply shocks that could disrupt the transition or the functioning of renewable-based energy. system. It is impossible to achieve complete self-reliance. This is reflected in the objectives of some of the EU’s most recent documents: the Green Deal industrial plan, the Critical Raw Materials Act and the Net Zero Industrial Act. The EU must maintain broad green diplomacy and continue to advocate and pursue the green transition across geopolitical dividing lines. In this respect, our relationship with China is essential, as it is a major source of important minerals and green technologies and a major source of pollution.
How do attitudes towards the green energy transition differ across EU member states and what impact do these have on EU policy?
For many years there has been a significant East-West divide in EU policy on climate and green transition. Eastern member states, especially countries like Poland, have been reluctant to support such policies, as evidenced by Warsaw’s initial opposition to the EU’s goal of climate neutrality by 2050. This is due to a number of reasons, including increasing dependence on coal and its weakening influence. A study of green parties and green topics in mainstream national politics. Additionally, for some eastern member states, eliminating energy dependence on Russia took precedence over the transition (and therefore building LNG terminals as quickly as possible rather than investing in the long-term goal of climate neutrality). This East-West divide somewhat oversimplifies the picture, and while there were differences even within the West (northern countries were generally more ambitious on climate policy), these differences existed in key negotiations. I think this distinction is somewhat less relevant today. This is not just because right-wing populists have lost power in Poland. On the positive side, there appears to be broad agreement that climate targets for 2030 and 2050 must be met to avoid climate catastrophe. On the negative side, green energy policies are increasingly under threat in the West as well. The West is experiencing a ‘greenlash’ led by right-wing parties and, in some cases, center-right parties seeking to regain lost popularity. Even in Western Europe, the pace of the green transition will depend on whether the far right takes power. I don’t think Marine Le Pen or Vox will prioritize a green transition, let alone an alternative for Germany.
you Written again in 2018 Italy’s Five Star Movement (5 star workout) and league (lega) the party was considered Russia-friendly. How has their position, and that of Italian politics more broadly, changed since the invasion of Ukraine?
Although the League has toned down its overt deference to President Putin and his policies, it remains Russia-friendly, ostensibly due to its ideological similarities (e.g. conservatism, nationalism, anti-LGBTQI+ views) with the ruling United Russia party. The Five Star Movement has undergone major changes since forming the federation and government in 2018. At least a third of the party’s voters at the time were right-wing voters disillusioned with mainstream right-wing parties. The Five-Star Alliance government collapsed in 2019, and the movement, under the leadership of Giuseppe Conte, has steadily moved towards the centre-left. He formed a government with the Democratic Party and later supported the Draghi government. The current movement’s skeptical stance towards large-scale military supplies to Ukraine has more to do with the strong pacifist tendencies of the Italian left and society and its preference for diplomatic negotiations. Although some party members occasionally tout this line, it has little to do with a pro-Russia stance. In fact, the party has never had ties with Russian institutions such as the League or Berlusconi’s Forza Italia. Moreover, opinion polls show that only a minority of Italians support arms shipments to Ukraine. This also explains why some opposition parties are trying to exploit this issue.
How do you think EU-Russia trade relations will develop in the long term? Will Russian fossil fuel imports ever return to previous levels?
Fossil fuel trading will never return to previous levels. Even if there are sudden (now highly unlikely) changes in Russian domestic politics and improved relations with the EU, the EU is committed to drastically reducing its fossil fuel consumption. This trend was already evident before 2022. The war and the EU’s response, especially the REPowerEU initiative, accelerated the process. At the same time, we must remember that the EU continues to import some pipeline gas, LNG, oil and nuclear fuel from Russia. Russia remains a very competitive exporter and could regain some of the ground it has lost simply as a result of market developments, especially if political relations improve. But it will never be the same as before the war. Russia itself has diverted a significant portion of its exports to Asian and other markets, and its leadership no longer wants the country’s economy and exports to become overly dependent on Western markets.
How should EU energy policy change and develop in the coming years to achieve climate change mitigation goals?
This is a big question. At a general level, domestic efforts, including financial commitments to the energy transition and climate agenda, must increase. Additionally, the entire society must be gradually reorganized toward a low-carbon economy. This will be extremely difficult, as most Europeans are not willing to give up climate-critical habits, such as driving their own cars or living very ‘energy-intensive’ lives. I doubt that individual choices will lead to the desired results in terms of climate goals. With widespread recognition of the devastating impacts of climate change, only decisive coordination from the top is likely to succeed. As I said earlier, on the global stage, the EU should pursue broad green diplomacy and seek cooperation on the energy transition across geopolitical divides. The EU should also support the low-carbon transition in the Global South, which lacks financial resources and technological know-how.
What is the most important piece of advice you can give to young scholars?
This is a tricky question. The answer depends on several factors. Very broadly speaking, it’s not easy to stay in academia if you have to focus on things that aren’t very interesting, so it’s a good idea to follow their interests in your research as much as possible. I also encourage you to take a critical stance on your research topics, especially in the social sciences. I think there is too much compliance due to funding mechanisms, peer pressure, and political pressure. Additionally, a truly international network is important if you want to understand how the world is developing. I very often find myself discussing global issues in a context where there is a dominant or even exclusive white Western perspective. Geopolitical or other dividing lines should not apply to academia.
Additional Resources on E-International Relations
