Dr. Karsten Friis is a Research Professor at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. His research interests include European security and defense policy with a focus on NATO, the Nordic region, the Arctic and transatlantic relations. He is a political scientist with a PhD from the University of Groningen, Cand.polit. He holds a bachelor’s degree from the University of Oslo and a master’s degree from the London School of Economics. Friis has been collaborating with the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) since 2007. Before that, he served as a political advisor to the Serbian Mission of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) (2004-2007). Montenegro (2001) and Kosovo (1999). Friis also spent several years in the Norwegian Armed Forces and served in the NATO/Kosovo Forces (KFOR) in Kosovo. He also frequently comments on public discourse, especially regarding the war between Russia and Ukraine. His recent publications include: ‘Nordic Defense: New Opportunities, Significant Challenges’, ‘Reviving Nordic security and defense cooperation‘,’Even if the war continues, NATO must open the door to defense integration with Ukraine‘ and ‘Rethinking Territory: How Ukraine Can Redefine Victory‘.
Where does the most interesting research/debate occur in your field?
The debates related to the dramatic changes in the world in terms of security and power transfers – the empirical debates – are by far the most interesting. Theoretical debates struggle to keep pace, which is not strange given the dynamics of the world. Thus, questions related to global governance, new alternative structures (from the ‘Shadow Fleet’ to BRICS), war and security (North Korean forces in Europe), new threats and technologies all challenge our traditional views of world politics.
How has the way you understand the world changed over time, and what (or who) prompted the most significant changes in your thinking?
As the world changes, so do our interests. I worked for many years in areas such as international operations, COIN, comprehensive approaches, and peacekeeping, but when full-scale war broke out in Europe, my focus changed. Although no one talks about R2P anymore, Russia’s attack is actually also an attack on the liberal values that R2P represents: universal human rights. The defense of Ukraine is the defense of the freedom of the people to choose their own way, foreign policy and international orientation.
What are the implications of the recent commitment of Nordic defense cooperation to the common security concept, and how might this affect NATO strategy in the Nordics?
Finland and Sweden’s accession to NATO opens up many new opportunities for defense cooperation between Northern Europe. Air and ground forces are in daily contact to ensure close integration. But all of this happens under the NATO umbrella, NATO planning, force structures and command and control. There is no independent Nordic strategy or concept, but rather an attempt to link regional forces into a unified force within NATO. That said, new plans for a combined air operations center, a new Army multi-corps headquarters, and other new structures clearly signal a renewed interest in defense cooperation.
The joining of Sweden and Finland greatly strengthens NATO and strengthens the defense of not only northern Norway, but also Sweden and Finland (after all, this is why they joined). NATO has a plan for the North West, one of NATO’s three strategic defense plans. New thinking is needed in terms of logistics and supply to these countries, especially through Norway and the Baltic Sea. NATO has to plan for all of this.
To what extent is Norwegian defense policy influenced by Norwegian identity and values?
I believe that the defense policy of every country, including Norway, is influenced by its identity and values. In our case, we are a small nation with a national identity (meaning a history of bridge-building, dialogue and trade), although it is partly built on the painful experience of occupation during World War II (hence we are a founding member of NATO). It is based on . Rather than conquest and power play, Norway’s deterrence against the Soviet Union and now Russia, for example, is restrained, with the country reducing its military presence adjacent to Russia to avoid “provocations” or escalating tensions. This is directly related to our identity and the narrative of ‘1,000 years of peaceful relations’ with Russia. Although this axiom can be deconstructed and questioned, it nevertheless continues to play a role in Norwegian security policy circles.
What improvements can be made to strengthen integration around Nordic defense? What major changes are needed to make this possible?
Nordic defense integration is a function of NATO membership. Depending on the details of NATO defense plans, command structures and force structures, opportunities for Nordic cooperation and integration become closer. For example, if Finland establishes a forward ground force unit on its territory, with Sweden as the primary country, other countries, including Denmark and Norway, may also contribute. Likewise, if NATO agrees to establish a joint air operations center in Norway, this would provide an opportunity for air forces to work more closely together. Some of these initiatives emerge from the Department itself, some are the result of NATO processes or at the political-strategic level.
I think we will end up with virtually a single air force, although still under national or NATO control. On land, forces are national, but Areas of Responsibility (AOR) can cross borders and are all part of joint division and corps headquarters. However, it is important not only to think about Northern Europe, but also to integrate with the larger powers involved in the region, especially the United States and the United Kingdom. All of the structures and other initiatives mentioned require the participation of important allies.
Do you think the Nordic response to the war in Ukraine is sufficient?
Nordic and Baltic countries have provided significant support to Ukraine. But I think more is needed, especially in the short term. I think 2025 will be a decisive year. Ukraine could win if we (the West) strengthen our defenses, not reduce them, as we did in 2023-24. In particular, our country, which has huge oil revenues, should invest much more in Ukraine than it does now. Among the Nordic countries we offer the least in real figures and in terms of GDP. It is truly urgent for the government to invest, especially in Ukraine’s defense industry. Success will be decisive.
How do you evaluate the relationship between the Nordic countries and major powers such as the United States, Russia, and China?
All Nordic countries have strong bilateral agreements with the United States in addition to NATO. This is very important because in the event of a large-scale conflict, other allies will not have the resources to assist. They’re going to try to maintain that regardless of who’s in the White House. Russia is a country that cannot engage in meaningful dialogue with any Nordic country. This will continue as long as Putin is in power. China is a bit more mixed. The Nordics will follow the EU and NATO’s language on China and try to eliminate risks, but not separate them. Trading in non-securitized issues continues. But there is significant Chinese investment in Sweden, for example in Volvo, that cannot be shaken up like that.
What is the most important piece of advice you can give to young scholars majoring in International Relations?
Read the classics! This is true not only in IR but also in sociology. Also read about scientific theories and philosophy. But stay relevant to the world around you. No one is interested in introspective, quasi-philosophical IR theory debates. Use theories and classics as you see fit to better analyze empirical phenomena. But don’t overcomplicate it. Have fun!
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