On 30 May, the process to change the way New Zealand rugby is governed began. This has significant implications for the relationship between New Zealand Rugby and Australian Rugby, particularly in Super Rugby.
What started out as a process to reform the NZ Rugby (NZR) board from a provincially dominated body to an independent body from direct provincial control, just as the AFL became independent of direct club control, did not work out that way.
Instead, the majority of states have implemented reforms that maintain significant state control over NZR boards over who participates and how they participate through a variety of mechanisms.
Supporters of the original reforms had argued that the resulting board would be unable to attract better talent than the current board, a claim that has proven seriously out of its depth over the past five years.
The new boards are scheduled to be installed by early August, so we’ll soon find out if that’s the case. What is certain is that New Zealand rugby has two groups pitted against each other in what is accurately described as a civil war: the Centralisers and the Provinces.
So far it’s been too political and too boring.
NZR CEO Mark Robinson. (Photo credit: Hagen Hopkins/Getty Images)
Any implications for Australian rugby seem a long way off. That may be true, but it may not. What’s interesting is who plays against each other, the very different attitudes to the competition and player development, and the associated attitude to Australia and New Zealand’s partnership in Super Rugby.
The Centralisers, who led the initial reforms of the Board, the NZ Rugby Players’ Association, Super Rugby Clubs of NZ, the Māori Advisory Board, NZ Rugby Commercial and Silver Lake, as well as a handful of provinces, are all committed to Super Rugby and NZ’s continued relationship with Australia in the SR. and, crucially, wants the Super Rugby club to become the only team playing professional rugby and take over the entire professional player development process in New Zealand.
At least in most provinces, the NPC wants to remain a significant professional competition, return to what it was in the late 1990s and early 2000s, and maintain control over professional player development. Competitions and professional development are at the heart of New Zealand rugby’s civil war. The problem for Australia is that no matter who wins this match, Australia’s SR performance is likely to be damaged.
The turning point in the battle will be the submission of the NZ Men’s Player Development Pathway Report to the NZR Board of Directors before they are appointed.
The report will conclude with absolute certainty that the performance of New Zealand professional rugby has been seriously damaged by the separation of SR and NPC for player development.
The report will likely then conclude that SR clubs should have a monopoly on developing professional players, and the provinces should only be concerned with the amateur/community game, spending the vast sums of money they get from NZR purely. Instead of spending mainly on provincial teams and player development, which is what they are doing now, finally some of that money should go to SR clubs instead.
This second conclusion will be stubbornly resisted in most provinces, which will instead seek reform of the NZR Council to at least provide a council that will defend the NPC’s seat.
But it’s more than that. There is enormous hostility towards Super Rugby in the provinces and there is considerable drive to make the NPC New Zealand’s main professional competition for the first four months of the season when the All Blacks are eligible to play.
The risks to Australian Super Rugby are clear. Although such an outcome is unlikely, an alternative victory would have bad consequences for Australia. If NZ’s SR clubs dominate all professional competitions in NZ, this will mean NZ SR teams will play around 25 games a year for product and player development as NZR looks to fill the gap left by the NPC’s top tier.
This will further develop the depth of the New Zealand SR team, giving them a huge advantage over the Australian SR team when it comes to SRPs, which the Australian SR team is already struggling to compete with.
There is no sign that financially struggling Australian SR Rugby can afford a similar expansion, despite the obvious benefits. Imagine if Leinster, Northampton, La Rochelle and Toulouse were restricted to playing just 14 games a year instead of the 22 or 30 they currently play.
Then imagine what would happen if NZ’s SR team played 25 rostered games a year with the same coach, almost the same players and the same structure. New Zealand rugby as a whole also has a very active incentive to do this with the World Club Championship just around the corner.
The number of NZ SR teams could also be expanded as part of the deal to ensure sufficient territory. Hawkes Bay and Bay of Plenty are particularly ambitious and a second SR team based in Auckland is also entirely feasible.
Adding one team at a time and increasing the number of games played to 25 per season per team will develop depth quickly, so performance against non-NZ SRP teams will only decline slightly.
NZRPA also wants to expand the number of genuine professional opportunities for its members, which could be crucial to the expansion of NZ SR. Because of the NPC, New Zealand’s Super Rugby footprint never expanded.
Not only did this unbalance the competitions these teams competed in, but it also harmed New Zealand rugby as the NPC was diluted to 14 teams after 2006.
Twenty years ago, rather than choosing between SR and NPC, New Zealand rugby opted for mediocrity in NPC and a bigger team in SR.
It was a costly and destructive mistake, and one way or another, it seems likely that it will soon be corrected. And it will be Australia’s SR team that will be the first to bear the brunt of New Zealand’s stronger and perhaps larger presence at the highest level of domestic rugby. Australia has already lost its rebels. How many of the other teams will survive is an open question.
