On October 7, 2023, one year has passed since Hamas attacked Israel. Despite warnings from military intelligence, Israel let down its guard. Two letters warned the Israeli government, followed by the Shin Bet relaying identical information hinting at a possible war planned by Iran’s proxies. The attack had to be timely, as they viewed Benjamin Netanyahu’s controversial judicial reforms as a weakness that created the potential for chaos within the Knesset and Israeli society. Since then, Israel’s war has not been limited to Hamas and Hezbollah. However, it applies to various militia groups across the Gulf in the form of an axis of resistance.
Iraq’s Islamic Resistance Army is also called the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU). Al Hashid Al Shaabi issued a statement condemning Zionist arrogance in Gaza and Lebanon. The group is comprised mostly of Shiites and includes the Badr Organization, Asaib Ahl al-Haq, Kataib Hezbollah, and Saraya Talia al-Khorasan. As far as the intensity of hostilities is concerned, Israel is fighting a two-front war with Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon. But fighting is taking place simultaneously on seven fronts across the Middle East, with most of the fighting concentrated in Lebanon. Since September 30, the IDF has attacked approximately 1,100 targets in southern Lebanon, destroying Hezbollah’s intelligence headquarters and weapons production sites.
Gradually, the belt of fire that Iran had created with its militias was flooded by a combination of Israeli cyberattacks and airstrikes. Moreover, direct confrontation between Israel and Iran is gaining momentum. Expectations that Hezbollah would block Israel’s advance into Lebanon did not materialize as many had expected, with the killings of top military commanders, including Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The IDF has opened a new front in western Lebanon along the Mediterranean coast, and airstrikes continue in the Bekaa Valley and south of Beirut. This camp is home to many Syrian refugees and Palestinians.
Hezbollah’s current retaliatory strategy is quite distant, deliberately avoiding close contact with Israeli forces and attacking from afar. For example, the commander of the IDF’s 36th Division observed that most Hezbollah fighters were retreating deep into Lebanon or leaving the battlefield for fear of being captured or killed. But some fighters are using landmines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to counterattack, while other fighters have been found sheltering in residential buildings. Moreover, the IDF acknowledged that, unlike Hamas, Hezbollah is organized in such a way that it operates on the ground with the help of long-range weapons systems and asymmetric attacks.
The IDF’s 188th Armored Brigade eliminated Hezbollah’s much-lauded special forces unit, the “Radwan Unit”, from border towns and destroyed their headquarters in Yarun and Maroun al-Ras. The 35th and 85th Brigades clashed with Hezbollah militia and discovered a 7m underground tunnel where ammunition was stored. The 36th Division fought militants in southern Lebanon and stopped at least 500 militants. In retaliation for the IDF’s ground operations, Hezbollah stepped up its missile attacks targeting new areas in northern Israel. Additionally, sources linked to Hezbollah claim: The IDF withdrew From Odaisseh and Kfar Kila. On October 8, 40 rockets were fired at the port city of Haifa, causing fear and panic among Israelis. Most were intercepted, but some injuries were reported from shrapnel. Another 110 medium-range missiles were fired at Haifa and 20 more at Kiryat Simona, killing two civilians. This is part of Hezbollah’s plan to demonstrate that its capabilities have not been weakened. So it’s demonstrating aerial strikes and taking aim at new targets deep inside Israel. The IDF’s 91st Division later reported seizing an undisclosed location in southern Lebanon, which was used to launch rockets to further prevent missile launches into northern Israel. But this does not mean Tel Aviv has secured its stated goal of returning residents to northern Israel.
Despite Israel’s fruitful military operations outside its territory, the internal security situation is worsening due to fierce attacks by the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). On October 8, a fighter from the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades stabbed and seriously injured several Israeli citizens. He was later killed by security forces. Ostensibly, he was from the northern Israeli city of Umm al Fahm. In another incident, four fighters from Al Aqsa were arrested and Yamam counter-terrorism units blocked traffic and opened fire preemptively to quell the threat. Finally, PIJ and Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades attacked Israeli forces at three separate locations using small arms and IEDs. These attacks are part of the Resistance Axis’ larger goal to keep the West Bank overheated, allowing a new front to capture Israeli security forces. Also notable is that Hezbollah has resumed its ability to fire rockets deep into Israeli territory. This is a sign that Hezbollah has regained tactical control over its missile arsenal along with the restoration of its command center. Although Hezbollah has regained control of its devastated command structure, not only has its arsenal been depleted, but its forces have also been demoted. Although reports on this are unclear.
Hezbollah’s deputy secretary general, Sheikh Naim Qassem, has formally called for a ceasefire, though he remains defiant, threatening that the militia will not stop if Israeli attacks are not halted. Although Hezbollah may appear defiant, the words of Ibrahim Moussaoui, a member of Hezbollah’s parliamentary bloc, do not inspire confidence in the current trajectory of the war against Israel. With Hezbollah leadership in disarray, fighters avoiding direct confrontation with the IDF, and limited combat capabilities, Israel is likely to step up its forces against Iran.
The United States, Iran and Arab countries are holding secret talks to end all wars in West Asia, with Israel allegedly keeping tabs on the plans. Iranian President Massoud Fezeshkian held talks with the Qatari government and met Saudi Arabia’s foreign minister, who later traveled to Riyadh to discuss rising casualties in Gaza and Lebanon and seek ways to avoid further escalation. Iran has threatened to break the Saudi-Iranian ceasefire if the Gulf states support Israel’s use of their airspace. This includes attacks on all U.S. military bases in the region, regardless of location. Therefore, Iran has sought neutrality in the Gulf countries. That is, not granting airspace for operations or utilizing military bases. Clearly this assurance has been given.
What is Israel’s expected plan of action against Iran? The considerable distance between Israel and Iran almost certainly rules out an Israeli ground invasion. Above all, Israel will absolutely need air-to-air refueling and may attempt to suppress or SEAD enemy air defenses with its F-35 stealth fighter jets to disrupt Tehran’s Integrated Air Defense System (IADS). It allows you to quickly perform precision strikes, stealth attacks, and aerial maneuvers for mobility in the air combat space.
Second, they could attack Esfahan, which has a military air base, F-14 Tomcat fighter jets, weapons factories, air defense systems, bunkers and nuclear enrichment facilities near Natanz. On April 19, Israel invaded Iranian airspace, using quadcopter drones and missiles to disrupt Iranian air defenses and successfully obliterate an S-300 anti-aircraft battery. This time they may be willing to further damage air defense systems and munitions depots.
Third, while there are widespread concerns that Israel will attack Iran’s nuclear facilities, a risky move that could draw in other powers and spark a broader conflict seems implausible and the United States has not supported it. Washington’s reluctance to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities stems from monitoring by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), which concluded that Iran’s supreme leader had not reversed his 2003 decision to build a bomb. But Iran’s hard-line lobby wants to speed up the process. It is known that destroying Iran’s nuclear facilities will not be an easy revenge. For example, Natanz’s nuclear facility is buried deep underground, while Fordow’s lies beneath rocks considered out of reach of Israeli bunker buster bombs. According to military experts (though this seems out of the question), the Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP), or GBU-57A/B, a massive 30,000-pound steel-packed bomb assembled jointly with the United States, could have destroyed the nuclear facility. I think it can be destroyed. .
Although it is unlikely that Iran’s nuclear facilities will be completely dismantled, it could lead to a rapid decline in Iran’s nuclear capabilities. Israel has stated that a large-scale attack on Iran would be a fatal surprise, so we will have to wait until this happens before we can provide further analysis.
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