From an article I published on December 17, 2023 E-International Relations, I argue that Somaliland’s independent peace and state-building, achieved through voluntary cooperation between communities who fought on opposite sides of the Somali civil war, is incompatible with the colonial interpretation and characterization of Somali culture and society pioneered by the British anthropologist I.M. I did it. boy name. This prompted German anthropologist Markus Hoehne, who draws heavily on the work of I.M. Lewis, to write a vitriolic response. As is typical for neo-Lewisian researchers, Hoehne begins by distancing himself from the most radical elements of Lewisian scholarship. He acknowledges that Lewis simplified Somali society and culture into ‘clans’, incorrectly attributed the root cause of the civil war to ‘clans’, and failed to acknowledge the upheaval in Somali society and culture caused by colonization.
Paradoxically, he launches into a passionate defense of Lewis’s interpretation and characterization of Somali culture and society. In doing so, he makes indefensible and factually inaccurate claims. To refute my argument, Hoehne wrote:
“Given that Isaaq is the demographic majority in Somaliland, and that voters primarily support paternal relatives because there are no real ideological differences between the parties, Isaaq candidates have always won regardless of the party they belong to. This alienated non-Isaak people and promoted the “Isaakization” of Somaliland politics under the guise of multi-party politics.
Characterizing Somaliland as a ‘clan state’ is a factually inaccurate statement because Isak candidates always win elections, thereby alienating non-Isaks. That this is true is readily apparent to anyone who has read the mainstream literature on Somaliland cited by Hoehne himself, such as Mark Bradbury (2008), Michael Walls (2014), and Marlen Renders (2012).
In April 2003, Dahir Riyale Kahin defeated Ahmed Mohamed Mohamoud Silanyo by 80 individual votes in Somaliland’s first general election under the multi-party system. Kahin is from the Gadabursi community, which makes up about 15% of Somaliland’s population, and fought on the side of President Mohamed Ziad Barre during the civil war. Silanyo is from the Isaaq community, which makes up about 70% of Somaliland’s population. He was also the longest-serving chairman of the Somali National Movement (1984-1990), a mainly Isaaq-based resistance group that fought against Barre’s dictatorship from 1982 to 1991. It took Somaliland 10 years to elect a minority candidate to the highest office. By comparison, it took more than 200 years for the United States to elect its first biracial president. Barkhad Batuun is currently one of the most popular politicians in Somaliland. He is from the Gabooye community, which makes up about 1-3% of the population. However, in this general election, he was elected with the highest number of individual votes. The tendency to overlook facts that contradict clan-centric understandings of Somaliland’s social and political affairs is common in Somaliland literature, and itself has been overwhelmingly criticized by Global North scholars who rely on the works of I.M. Lewis. It is produced by . This is arguably because there is virtually no debate in the mainstream literature on Somaliland, effectively creating a generation of unchallenged research.
Hoehne further argues that my analysis is “an expression of the author’s lack of analytical distance from the object of study.” He writes and concludes
“What’s worse is that Jamal Abdi is trying to hide his clannish views behind a terminological façade that references a “centralized state,” “democracy” and Lewis-bashing. A lens based not only on clans (Somali: qabiil) but also on clanism (Somali: qabiyalaad) by asserting positions”.
There is an implicit disqualification here of Somali scholars from producing knowledge about their own society and culture. According to Hoehne, they distance themselves from the object of study and cannot escape clanism. Conversely, we are asked to give credit to Western anthropologists for studying Somali society and culture in a neutral and objective manner. This attitude actually mimics the logic of colonialism, which foregrounds the abilities and moral virtues of white anthropologists. This is not the first time Hoene has expressed dismissive views about Somalia’s ability to produce serious scholarship. He has previously argued that Somalis lack academic awareness, sparking wider debates about power, privilege, authority and knowledge production within Somali studies.
After a long and bloody civil war, Somalilanders have not only created peace and built a democratic state without external political intervention, but they have achieved this through large-scale voluntary cooperation and consensus-based decision-making. Anyone who has seriously studied Somaliland’s formative years (1991-2001) cannot help but notice the virtually omnipresent pro-social behavior that made successful, independent peace and state-building possible. The following examples are just a few of many. Rather than adopting a bloody strategy during the civil war, the non-Isaq community, which had largely supported Barre, intervened and brokered peace when internal conflict broke out in the SNM in 1992. When another conflict broke out in 1995, Somaliland expatriates from Europe and North America organized themselves voluntarily to return to Somaliland and played a key role in restoring peace. In 1993, the SNM voluntarily disbanded and transferred power to a civilian government. According to Hoehne (2011: 336), this is “unprecedented in Africa’s post-colonial history.” What are the sources of prosocial behavior that proved important in Somaliland’s formative years? A basic reading of the literature on cooperation and collective action reveals that successful cooperation, especially large-scale cooperation, cannot be taken for granted. Indeed, as Mancur Olson argued in his book The Logic of Collective Action (1965), even harmony of interests is not a sufficient condition for successful collective action. Any organization seeking to achieve common goals must effectively deal with free riders, defectors, and spoilers. That is, the tension between short-term individual interests and long-term collective interests that creates social dilemma situations must be resolved. Why were Somalilanders able to effectively resolve and/or avoid social dilemmas?
In his ethnographic study of Somaliland, pastoral democracy (1961), IM Lewis argues that Somali society is highly egalitarian, devoid of formal coercive authority, and that clanism is a pervasive organizing force that dominates socio-political relations. Lewis himself did not speak Somali, so he relied on information recorded by the colonial government and what translators told him. This left him unable to access and deeply understand the intangible aspects of culture and society he sought to understand. By focusing too much on kinship structures, he forgot about other factors that drive the prosocial behavior necessary to maintain social order without overarching coercive authority or formal hierarchies. Kinship structures, which are empty social classification systems based on kinship and moral proximity, do not independently lead to prosocial or antisocial behavior. Social control mechanisms commonly used to maintain cooperation in egalitarian societies were not necessary in traditional Somaliland society. This includes the institutionalized practice of punishing social offenders, which, according to modern theories of collective action and cooperation, is a prerequisite for maintaining cooperation in an egalitarian society. Understanding governance in Somaliland requires shifting the focus from kinship relations to social rationality. ruleIt is mutually constitutive and a major source of prosociality in Somali (land) culture. The former supports the latter, and the latter promotes prosocial behavior. Instead of always seeking immediate personal rewards, socially rational agents act in pursuit of short-term and long-term goals. Given that in the ‘real’ world long-term individual interests are often inextricably linked to group interests, the prevalence of socially rational behavior can greatly reduce the perceived benefits of defection or free riding, thereby promoting cooperation.
Lewis and neo-Lewisian scholars who dominate knowledge production in Somaliland often discuss the following. rule As common law, it reduces this to a tangible agreement or contract. Reviews Michael Walls’ much-cited book on the trajectory of peace and state formation in Somaliland. Somalia Country – StathatHoehne writes, “One obvious criticism…is that the text does not generate new insights in its extensive background sections.” I agree with Hoehne on this point. In general, it can be said that the neo-Lewisian literature on Somaliland does not provide any new insights into Somali culture beyond what is found in the scholarship of I.M. Lewis. The latter focused too much on genealogical structure and took for granted the capacity for continued cooperation rather than explicitly identifying the sources of prosocial behavior that could maintain social order without coercive authority.
The claim that groups meet, negotiate, and reach agreements to resolve or prevent conflict is merely an observation and not an explanation supported by sound analysis. password It is more than just types of representations such as intergroup contracts. This is a shared normative order that defines the ‘rules of the game’. In practice, it performs the same function as a political system, or regime. It morally and normatively constrains and regulates behavior because its intangible foundations are based on the shared values and beliefs of a highly homogeneous society. I think it’s more insightful to say it this way: rule It shapes the behavior of so-called traditional elders who can represent the community rather than claim to govern it themselves. rulemaking the latter inseparable from the clan. It is composed of internalized norms, principles, and values. rule It also creates anonymous interpersonal relationships in a way that clans cannot.
In an upcoming peer-reviewed article, I argue for the following features: rule Since 1991, peace and state-building in Somaliland have benefited from the remnants of the factors that historically drove pro-social behavior. I don’t think it does anything to help non-Somali people understand Somali culture and society. In fact, I am greatly indebted to Somali and non-Somali scholars such as Lee Cassanelli, Lidwien Kapteijns, Catherine Besteman, and others who have contributed invaluable work to my research. The most important point I would like to raise is that to gain a more nuanced understanding of Somali culture, we must move beyond simplistic, reductionist and one-dimensional colonial anthropological explanations. I understand that I.M. Lewis’s scholarship provides an easily accessible and seemingly comprehensive framework for understanding Somali culture, history, and society. However, stubbornly adhering to the Lewisian paradigm while ignoring new analytical approaches can lead to oversimplification of the analysis and ultimately wrong policies.
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