Bulgaria is scheduled to hold parliamentary and European elections simultaneously on June 9. Petar Bankov I wrote that this election is unlikely to end the country’s long-term political instability.
This article is part of a series on the 2024 European Parliament elections. The EUROPP blog will also co-host a panel discussion on the LSE elections on 6 June.
When viewed through the prism of Bulgarian politics, the last European Parliament elections in 2019 seem like an eternity away. Five years ago, the main competition was between the centre-right Bulgarian Citizens’ Union for European Development (GERB) and the centre-left Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), with nationalist and liberal conservatives falling far behind the liberal-centrist Movement for Rights and Freedoms. (DPS) is the main representative of the large Turkish minority in Bulgaria.
Since then, Bulgaria’s political landscape has experienced a major shake-up, with growing divisions, marginalization of the left, and growing power of right-wing parties ranging from the liberal right to the populist radical right. This scrutiny is likely to be reflected in Bulgaria’s representation in the European Parliament (Table 1).
Table 1: European Parliament election results and opinion polls in Bulgaria
Note: 2024 election data comes from Market Links (April 29-May 9), Alpha Research (April 28-May 5), and Gallup International Balkan (April 22-May 2). Based on public opinion polls. Polls are cumulatively weighted based on the average deviation between the final polls for the five parliamentary elections from 2021 to 2023 and the actual results of those elections, as of the last day of voting. PP-DB data for 2019 includes only DB. DB’s current MEPs are members of the EPP group. PP has expressed interest in joining the ALDE Group. ITN has expressed interest in joining the ECR Group.
The upcoming June 9 election will be a dual election. In addition to the European Parliament vote, there will also be early parliamentary elections. Bulgaria has developed a habit of early elections. This will be the sixth time since 2021 that people will go to the polls to elect lawmakers, making it the post-war democracy with the largest number of parliamentary elections held in the shortest amount of time. period.
This political instability has institutional roots. Over the past four years, Bulgaria’s political elite has been unable to find consensus on the country’s future direction. The old forces, mainly represented by the established parties GERB, BSP and DPS, advocate gradual reforms that preserve their political and economic influence.
Meanwhile, the new generation of politicians and political parties centered on the liberal centrists include the PP (Continuing Change), the liberal right-wing Democracy in Bulgaria (DB), the revival of the populist radical right, and the populist conservatives. The People (ITN) seeks radical and rapid change in the country, but in a different direction. On the one hand, PP and DB advocate thorough anti-corruption and judicial reforms to deepen Bulgaria’s European integration. In contrast, Revival openly rejects Bulgaria’s EU and NATO membership, while ITN stands for the country’s European counterpart.
GERB and DPS continue to support Bulgaria’s integration in the EU, but this may be due to efforts to clean up its tarnished public image. In 2021 and 2023, leading politicians, especially Delyan Peevski, currently co-chair of the DPS, were added to the Magnitsky list of US-sanctioned individuals and companies accused of corruption in the energy sector, legislative and judiciary sectors. of power; Britain followed suit by adding Peevski to its sanctions list in 2023. The BSP maintains a somewhat moderate Eurosceptic stance, criticizing further integration of the European Union and the EU’s treatment of Bulgaria as a second-class member.
european agreement
The political divide described above highlights the distance between political parties in European positions, but in practice these differences are less clear. Overall, there is an overwhelming consensus among Bulgaria’s political elite in support of Bulgaria’s European integration, which transcends political divisions.
In fact, over the past year and a half, there have been large-scale ‘rallies’ (Sglovka) between GERB and the alliances of PP and DB. This was a rotating coalition government formed around the common goals of Bulgaria’s accession to Schengen and the Eurozone, constitutional reform of the judiciary, and reducing the powers of the president in the event of a political crisis.
The uneasy union passed these constitutional changes in late 2023 and partially achieved its Schengen goals on March 31, 2024, with Bulgaria entering the region by sea and air, but becoming a Schengen member by land, the main prize, has yet to be achieved. It’s hard to figure out. The coalition ended in March 2024 after the two sides failed to agree on rotation principles and how the coalition would work in the future, leading to calls for early elections in June.
This agreement extends further to topics on which the parties may potentially disagree. Differences of opinion over North Macedonia’s EU accession process are mainly about how firm Bulgaria should stand on North Macedonia’s demands for an amendment to the so-called French proposal, which would require North Macedonia to amend its constitution to recognize the survival of the Bulgarian minority. It’s about doing it. In the country.
In the European Green Deal, Bulgarian parties have done everything possible to show that they firmly reject plans to reduce jobs in coal mining regions and liberalize energy markets. Revival’s attempt to gather signatures for a referendum on eurozone membership was rejected by parliament. One notable difference is on the issue of Russia’s war in Ukraine and EU sanctions against Russia. Revival and BSP oppose military aid to Ukraine and support lifting sanctions against Russia.
A clear vision is needed
In situations where there is broad consensus, political competition is primarily concerned with issues of valence of capabilities rather than substantive political differences. This has become particularly clear in the debate over the ongoing delays in the submission and revision of Bulgaria’s plan to the Stability and Growth Pact. But largely, the agreement conceals a general lack of clear vision from Bulgarian political parties on how to handle Bulgaria’s EU membership.
Parties supporting further EU integration have expressed little idea of shaping the process to maximize expected benefits for the country, agreeing instead to a broader direction of travel determined elsewhere. Opponents who are skeptical or outright reject this membership offer a vague vision of sovereignty and fail to recognize Bulgaria’s geopolitical situation, which is close to several major conflicts in Eastern Europe and the Middle East and the resulting multidimensional problems.
continuation of instability
Overall, Bulgaria’s European Parliament elections remain in the shadow of the parliamentary elections. Most political parties have been late in publishing their manifestos for the European Parliament elections, and even at the level of discourse these elections are treated as secondary elections. GERB’s slogan is “For a stable Bulgaria in a safe Europe”, while BSP’s slogan is “For a proud Bulgaria in a peaceful Europe”. This is a logical result of Bulgarian political parties becoming entrenched in domestic politics.
The expected outcome of the parliamentary elections is not much different from that of the European Parliament, with another divided parliament consisting of six or seven parties and alliances expected to still face difficulties in forming a stable coalition government. In this context, the dual elections in June are unlikely to break the frozen relationship between the two main actors in Bulgarian politics (GERB and the PP-DB alliance), while another potential government formation would be too fragile and toxic for Bulgarian politics. There will be. Images of the parties involved. All of this points to continued political unrest, with the possibility of more early elections in the fall.
This instability further deteriorates the relationship between Bulgarian society and political institutions. Over the past four years, voter turnout has decreased significantly (from 52.7% in 2017 to 40.6% in 2023), and support for “none of the above options” has increased (from 2.5% in 2017 to 4.1% in 2023). increases to). ). Public trust in political systems also remained significantly low. A recent study of unrepresented segments of Bulgarian society shows that a growing number of eligible voters do not see any tangible benefits or improvements in their daily lives through political activity, leading to growing apathy and indifference to politics.
This appears to reflect the stagnation of Bulgaria’s labor market despite the declining inflation rate. There were a series of large-scale protests in various industries, including agriculture, coal mining, and the energy sector, but these were resolved through increased state investment in these sectors. However, the persistent problem of misalignment between public and elite concerns remains. Eurobarometer for April 2024 shows that the three most important topics for the Bulgarian public in the next European elections are fighting poverty and social exclusion (48%), supporting the economy and creating new jobs (40%) and public health (34%). ), an issue that the major political parties rarely discussed during the campaign.
Note: This article gives the views of the author and not the position of EUROPP (European Politics and Policy) or the London School of Economics. Featured image source: Alexandros Michailidis / Shutterstock.com
