Since Somaliland unilaterally declared independence in May 1991, the unrecognized state has set a democratic record that few countries in the developing world can match. On November 13, 2024, Somalilanders cast their votes at 2,000 polling stations across the country. The main opposition party, Wadani, led by Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi (Shiro), won a clear victory with 63.92% of the vote, while the incumbent president received 34.81%. Shortly after Somaliland’s National Electoral Commission (NEC) called for elections to the city, President Muse Bihi Abdi generously conceded defeat, calling for national unity and expressing his commitment to ensuring a smooth transition of power. On December 12, 2024, the outgoing and incoming presidents symbolically arrived together and smiled at Cirro’s inauguration ceremony, marking another smooth and peaceful transfer of power following Somaliland’s democratic elections. Since 1991, Somaliland has held four multi-party general elections, all of which international observers have deemed free and fair. Most recently, international observers described the election as “free, fair and credible despite constraints on Somaliland’s financial and institutional resources.” So why does democracy work in Somaliland?
After publishing ethnographic research in 1961, pastoral democracyBritish anthropologist IM Lewis profoundly shaped the outside world’s understanding of Somali society, culture, and history. Throughout his long career, Lewis has argued that Somali society is best understood through the lens of a segmented clan system in which corporate groups fuel conflict and lead to endemic violence. This interpretation portrays Somalis as a fundamentally warlike people, putting loyalty to their clan above all else. In Lewis’s interpretation, this ultimately explains the root causes of the civil war and the subsequent collapse of the central state in 1991. Anthropologists have long argued that cultures, customs, and traditions constantly evolve and change, but Lewis stubbornly denied that possibility. Colonialism has had a negative impact on Somali culture and society.
Despite the obvious flaws in Lewis’s interpretation, his influence cannot be overstated. This is because Lewis’s framework fundamentally shaped mainstream scholarship in Somaliland. For example, Michael Walls argues that “one way or another, ‘we’re all Lewisites now,’ we’ll start with the Klan.” at festschrift Further developed in memory of I.M. Lewis, Markus Hoehne and the late Virginia Lulling. According to them, the ‘progress question’, i.e. “the question of how to contribute to Somalia studies that Lewis has not yet addressed”, remains an ongoing problem. About this, Ali Jimale Ahmed wrote:
Explaining intellectual, academic and methodological disagreements as ‘professional issues’ is downright ridiculous. To claim that nothing has changed in the construction and meaning of clan identity over the years is to ignore the dialectical nature of reality.
Even a cursory examination reveals that the existence of Somaliland as a centralized democratic state runs counter to a key assumption of Lewis’s interpretation. According to the latter, an inclusive and democratic Somali state should be impossible because it would inevitably be corrupted by a pervasive and persistent clan system. Despite recent regional conflicts in Somaliland’s eastern region, it is widely recognized that the peace and state formation process in Somaliland has included the voluntary participation of all communities. Self-help peace and state formation achieved through voluntary cooperation between groups fighting on opposite sides of a bloody civil war are fundamentally incompatible with Lewis and his followers’ interpretation and characterization of Somali society and culture.
As mentioned above, Lewis’s critics emphasize the negative effects of colonization, arguing that it fundamentally changed society and politicized cultural identity (kinship). Lewis’s pioneering critics, Abdi and Ahmed Ismail Samatar, recently said: Dependence, justice, equality”. Lewis’s critique of the impact of colonization provides valuable insights, but it also has limitations. Given the fundamental argument that colonization has fundamentally eroded the spirit of pre-colonial cultures, little is offered in terms of explaining successful self-directed peace-building in Somaliland.
Recently, Abdi Ismail Samatar rejected the idea that Somaliland’s traditional institutions of governance were better preserved in Somaliland than in south-central Somalia. Somaliland was under indirect British rule as opposed to direct Italian rule. Somaliland’s success was partly due to insight. These are the words of the second president, Mohamed Hagi Ibrahim Egal. First, the trajectory of peace and state formation in Somaliland involved numerous actors and stakeholders, including traditional elders, businessmen, intellectuals, women’s groups, religious leaders, and ordinary citizens. Second, Egal did not participate in the political scene until immediately before the Borama Conference. 1993. Third, no individual or group’s insight can explain the overwhelming pro-sociality that made successful peace and state formation possible without external support. Consider the following example: When the conflict broke out in 1995, a group of Somaliland expatriates organized themselves voluntarily, left their comfortable lives in Europe and North America, returned to Somaliland, and played a key role in resolving the conflict.
In a forthcoming article, I propose a third interpretation that pragmatically bridges competing perspectives in Somalia studies. In doing so, the article rejects the idea that Somaliland was unaffected by nearly eight decades of indirect British rule, while also expressing reservations about the claim that colonization led to a complete breakdown in the spirit of pre-colonial culture. We document the usefulness of culture-specific practices in Somaliland’s peacebuilding trajectory. According to this line of reasoning, peacebuilders in Somaliland benefited from the remnants of culturally specific factors that have historically driven prosociality.
Considering Somaliland’s status just In the case of unrecognized states, it is easy to infer that they have strategically adopted democracy to satisfy external normative demands. Developing this argument, Rebecca Richards writes that “achieving state recognition became a key goal of the territorial government, with the creation of a democratic state at the center of Somaliland’s strategy.” However, a careful study of Somaliland’s history reveals the lack of a causal link between democratic governance and the ongoing quest for recognition. The Somali National Movement (SNM), which fought against the dictatorship of Maxamed Ziad Barre from 1982 to 1991, issued a political declaration titled ”’ shortly after its founding in 1981. a better alternative. The declaration proposed “incorporating traditional institutions of governance into the government in a bicameral legislature with a Senate.” Officially institutionalized in 1993, Somaliland’s current mixed regime first took shape in 1981. Until independence was declared in 1991, SNM maintained that its main goal was to liberate Somalia from the dictatorial rule of Maxamed Ziad Barre and restore democracy. For example, in 1986, SNM stated: “SNM’s main goal is to abolish the dictatorial, decadent and destructive regime of Siad Barre in Somalia and restore democratic principles in government. Even in May 1991, the SNM leadership opposed a declaration of independence, but eventually they were influenced by elders representing all communities in Somaliland.
In short, while political separation from Somalia was not seriously considered until 1991, democracy was actually part of the plan from the beginning. There is little evidence that Somaliland has followed external normative demands in its peace and state-building processes. Rather, it deliberately departed from the idealized Weberian model of the state by creating a bicameral parliament composed of a House of Councilors.Gurti). The main reason why democracy works in Somaliland is that it is not an externally imposed or alien system of governance. It is important to remember that Somaliland was governed on democratic principles long before the advent of colonial powers. Since 1991, Somalilanders have built themselves a democratic state suited to their own culture and social structure rather than appeasing an external audience. Somaliland clearly emphasizes its democratic achievements by advocating for: just It is clear that the explanatory power of ongoing inquiry in understanding the design and functioning of Somaliland’s state and society is limited.
Additional Resources on E-International Relations
