This means that part of Trump’s price for accepting continued supplies from EU member states to Ukraine could be a promise not to allow such weapons to be used against targets inside Russia. But there could be an exception for targets inside Russia, such as those near the Ukrainian border, which under President Joe Biden did not bring the U.S. into direct conflict with Russia, and so under Trump it would not need to be.
But the fact remains that Trump must maintain America’s commitment to NATO if European allies are to secure supplies to Ukraine in the face of a nuclear-armed Putin.
And that leads to another problem. Trump thinks European countries should do more to defend themselves. He famously said that if NATO members don’t pay their fair share of the alliance, he would encourage Russia to “do whatever it wants.”
So any deal that Trump is committed to continuing to support Ukraine will have to include a credible commitment to increased defense spending. And while Trump’s potential advisers might be receptive to such a claim in principle, it’s questionable whether NATO members will realistically deliver what his advisers expect.
Colby made it clear that European allies should spend 3-4% of their GDP on defense. However, it is unlikely that some of Ukraine’s most important suppliers of military equipment, including Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK, will spend 3% of their GDP on defense in the near future.
Nevertheless, defense spending in European NATO members is increasing, with Britain’s expected to increase to 2.5% of GDP, and increasingly militarized Poland’s projected to increase to 5% by 2025. So it’s possible that the allies will persuade Trump’s advisers not to force a peace deal on Ukraine, but instead to come up with a formula that would have European allies provide military support for Ukraine, but with some targeting conditions attached.
Of course, that string won’t please Zelensky. But at the very least, a bad deal with Trump could delay an even worse deal with Putin.
