One explanation for Emmanuel Macron’s decision to call snap legislative elections in France is that he believes the National Coalition will win, govern and “spoil” ahead of the next presidential election. But like this: Donato Di Carlo and Federica Genovese To illustrate, the records of other European populist parties in power suggest that threats of chaos ensuing from national rallies may be at least partly unfounded.
June’s European elections saw a sharp shift to the right in the European Parliament. The most shocking result was the landslide victory of the French National Rally (RN). In response, Emmanuel Macron dissolved the French National Assembly. This decision brought financial chaos to France and sparked heated debate among European elites.
Among the various possible interpretations, notable commentators have argued that Macron’s bet was for the RN to win, take power and “screw it”. This is a risky move in the hope of discrediting the RN ahead of the next French presidential election. But the cool reception of the news by national rallies and the confusing offer to forge a political alliance with the center-right Republicans suggest that the RN is ready for the challenge. Clearly, this decision may give space to the far right in the legislature and executive branch in 2027.
Gambling on the Populists
At a time when even Macron’s closest supporters are perplexed, they may legitimately question the logic behind the president’s moves. Perhaps this stems from an old assumption about the economic consequences of extremist parties: that these parties are economically incompetent and bring financial instability, so that a centrist republican front must inevitably seize power.
The current incident therefore raises interesting questions. In other words, does extremism, especially hard-line (right-wing) populist parties, inevitably lead to economic instability? Or is reality more complicated? Is there more market appetite for some forms of populism than some believe? And does that change when those parties are in power on the electoral stage?
The experience of Italy’s current far-right leadership under Giorgia Meloni offers some insights. Despite a severe demographic crisis and long-term stagnation in productivity and wages, the Italian economy has not fallen into recession. Rather, it is performing relatively well compared to France, Germany, and the United Kingdom.
While the economic upward trend is certainly rooted in the policies launched by the previous government (investment-led growth was bolstered by Italy’s superbonus program and recovery fund), Meloni’s management has gone further than reversing the trend. This government’s track record shows that a coalition of right-wing populist parties can govern without serious financial disruption for at least two and a half years. What explains these results?
limitations of power
As political scientist Peter Mair has argued, all political parties face a dilemma between the two. responsiveness – Responsive to the constituency – and responsibility, which governs the economy responsibly for the common good and in accordance with binding legal and international constraints. A characteristic of radical parties is that they take, at least in principle, extreme positions on a variety of public policy issues.
Clearly, the more extreme a party’s electoral position, the more difficult it is to reconcile response and accountability and respond to the needs of voters once in power when legal and financial constraints become binding. In a similar vein, the more binding constraints are placed on the government, the more difficult and costly it is for the ruling party to shift its economic policy-making process toward a radical position.
The government’s influence on economic policy decisions is somewhat limited due to domestic and international factors, particularly in Europe due to the economic governance regime of the Eurozone. This institutional structure has given European extremist parties limited authority over fiscal and monetary issues, which has encouraged them to focus on “noisy” issues such as cultural or immigration politics.
Another reason is that while politicians come and go, bureaucrats remain, and bureaucrats run the country every day. Populist parties with little experience in power are especially dependent on the cooperation of managers to design and implement policies. Like Italy, France relies on a specialized bureaucracy with civil servants who can act as a brake on responsible economic policymaking.
Externally, European governments can be seen as having gained ‘semi-sovereignty’ in the multi-level politics of the EU. The economic and social policies of eurozone governments are strictly limited by the European Semester. The European Semester aligns budgetary and economic policies with targets agreed at EU level.
But while France may often be considered “too French to fail” (“parce que c’est la France”), the Commission is prepared to condemn and shame France for its excessive deficit procedures. As if this were not enough, the ruling extremist party is likely to face greater financial stress due to the higher borrowing costs demanded by bond vigilantes as they confront their extremist agenda. This provides a huge incentive for extremist parties to act on economic issues.
How did all this unfold in Italy?
For Meloni’s government, internal and external constraints forced it to pivot towards taking on more responsibility, while at the same time creating marginal policies around electoral costs and noisy cultural issues. Externally, the Meloni administration supported normalization with voters by pointing out Italy’s vulnerability and the need to “transform Europe from within,” as international financial observers say.
Against this background, Meloni appears to have seized the opportunity to embrace convention and institutionalization. As a result, she has maintained an (obvious yet ambiguous) balance between responsiveness and accountability that pays off materially (for example, in terms of current access to European resources such as NextGenerationEU funds) and reputationally.
The victims of this process are, above all, those on the receiving end of the “cultural policy” with which these parties fight instead of the economic fight. See, for example, Meloni’s focus on identity issues and abortion rights. But there are other losers in the long run, especially the mostly technocratic and centrist parties that resemble Macron’s renaissance. But ultimately, far-right parties differ from country to country, and so do the conditions under which they can adapt and thrive while in power.
So if Italy’s experience as a whole can teach us anything, it’s that the assumption that Macron’s gamble will pay off if extremist parties win because they are inherently economically incompetent may be wrong, and that leaders who expect it to This means that it can be expensive for them. Once in power, they are systematically derailed. Conversely, the experience of radical populist parties in power across local governments shows that radical parties tend to project their governance performance and capacity by focusing on balancing budgets and reducing debt levels in line with their desire to establish a more mainstream position.
Note: This article gives the views of the author and not the position of EUROPP (European Politics and Policy) or the London School of Economics. Featured image source: Alexandros Michailidis / Shutterstock.com
